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DISABILITY, VULNERABILITY, AND THE LIMITS OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Ani B. Satz∗
Abstract: Despite the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
disabled Americans face substantial barriers to entry into the workplace, lack material
supports including health care and transportation, and may not receive reasonable
accommodation that best supports their functioning. In addition, individuals with
impairments have difficulty qualifying as disabled for disability protections. In light of these
problems, some commentators suggest that a civil rights or antidiscrimination approach to
disability discrimination—an approach for which activists fought for twenty years prior to
the enactment of the ADA—may not adequately address disability discrimination. Some
critics advocate a return to the social welfare model that ADA activists struggled to avoid,
namely, a model focused on material supports for disabled persons.
I argue that reforming disability law requires a blend of the civil rights and social welfare
models as informed by a novel lens: vulnerability as universal and constant. The current
antidiscrimination approach to disability law reform is limited because it views disability as a
narrow identity category and fragments disability protection. Fragmentation, a new concept I
develop in this Article, results when susceptibility to disability discrimination is treated as if
it arises in discrete environments, such as the workplace and particular places of public
accommodation. Viewing vulnerabilities as situational generates a host of problems: it results
in a patchwork of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful social participation,
fails to appreciate the hyper-vulnerability (extreme sensitivity) of disabled individuals to
certain environmental changes, artificially restricts the protected class by creating a false
perception that some individuals with significant impairments are not disabled because they
are able to function in particular circumstances or environments, and disregards the benefits
of conceptualizing vulnerability to impairments as affecting disabled and nondisabled
persons alike.
Interpreting Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability and applying it for the first time
within disability legal studies, I argue that vulnerability to disability and the vulnerabilities
disabled individuals experience more acutely than those without disability are both universal
and constant. The shared vulnerabilities of disabled and nondisabled individuals suggest the
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need to restructure completely social institutions to respond to barriers to work and social
participation. For practical reasons, I advocate a compromise focused on disabled persons
with regard to accommodation for employment and some aspects of social participation: a
move away from the standard antidiscrimination approach, which fragments protections, to
an approach that treats vulnerability as extending across environments and enables a broader
provision of material supports for disabled individuals. In particular, the reasonable
accommodation mandate should be expanded with governmental supports to allow disabled
workers accommodations both inside and outside the workplace that facilitate their
employment. Additionally, a dialogue between employers and employees about
accommodating disability should be mandatory, and employees should be entitled to
reasonable accommodation that supports their preferred methods of functioning. Given the
current legal structures in place, however, recognizing vulnerability to illness as universal
suggests the need for universal health care, or treating access to health care as a matter of
social welfare rather than disability law.

INTRODUCTION............................................................................514
I. Disability and Universal Vulnerability ........................................523
A. Fineman’s Vulnerability Thesis ..........................................524
B. Universal Vulnerabilities to Disability and for Disabled
Persons.…………………………………………………...527
1. Situating
Vulnerability
Theory
Within
Existing
Antidiscrimination Critique.............................................528
2. Applying Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory to Disability 530
II. THE LIMITS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION .........................532
A. Disability as an Identity Category .......................................535
B. Disability Law as Fragmenting Disability Protection .........541
1. Disability and Vulnerability to Discrimination ...............541
2. Protection Interrupted ......................................................544
3. Artificial Restriction of the Protected Class ....................547
III. BLENDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE .....550
A. Rethinking Reasonable Accommodation ............................554
1. Addressing Barriers to Employment ...............................555
2. Supporting Atypical Modes of Functioning ....................558
B. Disability and Health Care Justice ......................................561
CONCLUSION ................................................................................567
INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the future of American disability law depends on the
continued role of a civil rights or antidiscrimination approach to
disability discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
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(ADA)1 recognizes disability as a protected class2 and creates a mandate
against discrimination in the employment, service, and public
accommodation contexts.3 The ADA is a civil rights statute premised on
notions of formal equality,4 providing equal opportunity to individuals
identified as disabled under the Act.5 While the ADA requires some
material accommodations to facilitate entry into public places,6 access to
public services and transportation,7 and workplace functioning,8 it is an
unfunded mandate. Congress did not intend the reasonable
accommodation provision to serve as a social welfare measure but as a
civil rights requirement; in fact, Congress viewed reasonable
accommodation as a means to avoid dependency by increasing access to
the workforce and facilitating social participation.9
As a formal statement that the government recognizes and opposes
discrimination against disabled persons, the ADA is successful on its
face.10 Additionally, the lives of some disabled individuals have
undoubtedly been improved as a result of its passage. Workers with

1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000), amended
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
2. Id. § 12101(a)(7) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority[.]”). While
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 strikes this language, it retains the threshold test for protected
class membership. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555(2008).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (employment); § 12132 (public services including transportation); § 12182
(public accommodation and public transportation operated by private entities).
4. Id. § 12101(a)(7)–(9) (discussing disability as a protected class, equality of opportunity, and
the need for disabled individuals to “compete on an equal basis”).
5. Id.
6. Id. §§ 12183–84.
7. Id. §§ 12142–48, 12184.
8. Id. § 12111(9).
9. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 7 (1989)
(statement of Rep. Tony Coelho) (“We are not looking for welfare . . . . We just want an opportunity
to be able to live and be able to have an opportunity to work . . . to be productive citizens. We know
that there is going to have to be accommodations to give us our basic civil rights.”); see also
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 636–40 (2004) (discussing congressional intent to
address the exclusion of disabled persons from the workforce with the reasonable accommodation
mandate).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 37 (2000) (“[T]he ADA was critically important
to the establishment of a major federal commitment to the mission of employing people with
disabilities and providing them with vastly expanded access to public programs and
accommodations.”).
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hidden disabilities are no longer subject to pre-employment exams.11
Buildings are more accessible to individuals with mobility
impairments.12 Evidence suggests that the most egregious acts of
discriminatory exclusion may be in the past.13 Further, the ADA serves
as model legislation in more than forty-six countries.14
Nevertheless, disabled individuals continue to face some of the same
unemployment and isolation issues that motivated Congress to enact the
ADA. First, depending on which studies one finds compelling,
employment rates of disabled persons are either unimproved15 or lower16
11. See Paul Steven Miller, The EEOC’s Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act in
the Sixth Circuit, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 217, 221 (1998) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)).
12. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,469 (proposed June 17, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35)
(proposing regulations to address commentator views that “more than seventeen years after the
enactment of the ADA, as facilities are becoming physically accessible to individuals with
disabilities, the Department [of Justice] needs to focus on second-generation issues that ensure . . .
accessible elements . . . such as ticketing in assembly areas and reservations of boat slips.”); see also
153 CONG. REC. S10211 (2007) (Statement of Sen. Harkin) (“We have made great advances: . . .
curb cuts, accessible buses, accessible trains, widened doors. Every building now built in the United
States of America is fully accessible.”). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited
Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006)
(“[T]estimony from advocates across the country affirms that many if not most businesses remain
inaccessible, even in circumstances where it would be easy to remove barriers.”).
13. See 153 CONG. REC. S10210–11 (2007) (Statement of Sen. Harkin) (“[W]hen I first came to
the House and then to the Senate to work on these issues, the issues [were about] the discrimination
against Americans with disabilities and how people with disabilities had been kept out of the
mainstream of American life, how they had been shunted aside, warehoused, categorized in ways
that demean their personhood in ways that prevented them from contributing all they could to our
American society . . . . We now include people with disabilities under a broad civil rights
umbrella . . . . We have made great advances since that time.”); see also Paul Steven Miller,
Reclaiming the Vision: The ADA and Definition of Disability, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 769, 777 (2003) (“I
was told [in the 1980s] by one law firm that even though they personally did not have a problem
with my size [short stature], they feared that their clients would think that they were running . . . ‘a
circus freak show’ if their clients were to see me as a lawyer in their firm.”); cf. Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Handicapped and the H.
Subcomm. on Select Educ., 100th Cong. 75 (1988) (statement of Judith Heumann, World Inst. of
Disability) (“In 1981, an attempt was made to forceably [sic] remove me and another disabled
friend [in wheelchairs] from an auction house because we were ‘disgusting to look at.’”).
14. Sharona Hoffman et al., The Definition of Disability in the Americans With Disabilities Act:
Its Successes and Shortcomings: Proceedings of the 2005 Annual Meeting, Association of American
Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination Law; Labor Relations and Employment Law;
and Law, Medicine and Health Care, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 473, 492 (2005).
15. See, e.g., DAVID C. STAPLETON, RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & ANDRED J. HUNTVILLE, HAS
THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES DECLINED? 1–4 (2004), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/92 (discussing a decline in the employment of
disabled individuals of working age based on Current Population Survey Data), permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n15.pdf; Daron Acemoglu &
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than before the passage of the ADA. Commentators believe that fear of
costly accommodation17 or litigation18 may be disincentives for firms to
hire disabled workers.
Second, lack of sufficient supports—including health care and
transportation—prevents many disabled persons from accessing or
retaining jobs and thereby increases their isolation.19 Public wage and
health benefits under Social Security are limited and may require a
claimant to prove total and permanent disability, meaning, with some
exceptions, that one cannot return to work and continue to receive the
same Social Security benefits.20 The working disabled who have
Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 929 (finding a sharp decline in 1993 of the employment of
disabled men between twenty-one and thirty-nine years old, and in 1992 a decline for women of the
same age; both measurements are relative to the employment of workers without disability within
the same age ranges); Kathleen Beegle & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability
Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM. RESOURCES 806, 850 (2003) (finding state disability
discrimination laws did not result in a decrease in employment for disabled persons prior to the
enactment of the ADA).
16. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of
Disability Discrimination, 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper Services, 2004),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10740 (finding causal relation in years immediately
following
enactment
of
the
ADA),
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n16.pdf; cf. John J. Donohue, III & James
J. Heckman, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: Re-Evaluating
Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713 (1991) (arguing that civil rights protections
decreased employment of persons of color).
17. See, e.g., Jolls & Prescott, supra note 16 at 2.
18. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 917 (“[T]he negative effects of the ADA
may have been due more to the costs of accommodation than to the threat of lawsuits for wrongful
termination, though poor measurement of separation rates may also account for this result.”). But
see Jolls & Prescott, supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that employee discharge litigation costs are not a
factor in the employment of disabled individuals); cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of
Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 12 (arguing that litigation is a way of enforcing the
reasonable accommodation mandate).
19. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 26–34 (2004).
The significance of health care coverage for employment may be overstated, however. Australians
have universal health care and a three to four percent higher unemployment rate for disabled than
nondisabled workers. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability, Ageing and Careers: Summary
of
Findings
(2003),
at
26,
available
at
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/
ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/978A7C78CC11B702CA256F0F007B1311/$File/44300_2003.pdf,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n19.pdf.
20. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is paid to individuals with previous sufficient
payroll contributions. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, 2008 RED BOOK, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/overview-disability.htm [hereinafter RED BOOK], permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n20a.pdf. Monthly support
increases with previous earnings, though the average estimate for 2008 is $1,004 to each individual
per month. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, FACT SHEET SOCIAL SECURITY: 2008 SOCIAL SECURITY
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employee benefit plans may also not receive medical services necessary
to manage the effects of their disabilities, as the ADA generally does not
apply to the content of health insurance policies.21 While public
transportation services are covered under the ADA,22 routes and vehicles
are limited. As a result, disabled individuals compete with the growing
elderly population over benefits such as Paratransit, which provides vital
transportation for some disabled employees to and from the workplace.23
Third, workplace accommodations remain contentious. An interactive
process in which employees and employers discuss preferred
accommodations is not federally mandated, meaning uniform
requirements for the employer-employee dialogue do not exist.24 The
CHANGES, available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2008.pdf,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n20b.pdf.
Recipients of SSDI are eligible for Medicare. See RED BOOK. Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
is a means-tested program paying $637 per month in 2008. See id. Individuals receiving SSDI are
also eligible for Medicaid. Id. Both SSDI and SSI benefits are predicated on an inability to work.
See id. Under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, individuals who
return to work may be able to maintain limited health coverage and cash payments. Pub. L. No. 106170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-19 (2000)). Medicare beneficiaries may
keep their insurance for eight and a half years. Id. § 202. Medicaid coverage may be extended or
available for purchase. Id. § 201. Generally speaking, cash payments are phased out, given
sufficient wages. See RED BOOK.
21. Title III requires that health insurance offices be accessible as places of public
accommodation, but health insurers may determine what health care services are covered under
their policies, so long as distinctions are not made on the basis of disability. See Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d
179, 185–89 (5th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558–60 (7th Cir.
1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998); Lenox v. Healthwise
of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 455–57 (6th Cir. 1998). But see Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198
F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We believe an entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by
the statute to provide disabled persons with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to
sell them its merchandise by reason of discrimination against their disability.”).
Similarly, Title II, which pertains to public services, does not apply to benefits coverage of state
health care plans. See, e.g., Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir.
1999).
Under Title I, employers who act as insurers are prohibited from making “disability-based
distinctions”—treating individuals with disabilities differently from other insureds—but this
limitation does not require employers to provide any particular benefits, including mental health
services. See supra notes 241–46 and accompanying text. A disability-based distinction is one based
on a particular disability, a discrete group of disabilities, or disability in general. See id.; see also
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 511 (2008).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12184 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Liberty Res., Inc. v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 155 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244, 257–58 (E.D.
Pa. 2001), vacated and appeal dismissed after compliance with court order, 54 F. App’x 769 (3d.
Cir. 1992) (finding liability under Title II for a transportation authority that effectively split
Paratransit rides between elderly and disabled riders).
24. An interactive process is recommended by the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2008).
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ADA requires that a worker who discloses a disability and requests an
accommodation receive only “a” reasonable accommodation to facilitate
her functioning in the workplace.25 The accommodation might not be
one that an individual prefers or that best promotes her functioning.26
There is no requirement, for example, that accommodations support
atypical modes of functioning.27 Further, accommodations are confined
to the physical workspace or to modifications to the work day.28
Accommodations do not include assistive devices that facilitate an
individual’s employment by supporting her functioning both at home
and at work.
Fourth, many individuals with functional impairments have difficulty
qualifying as disabled for civil rights protections.29 A significant portion

The process is adopted in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Dargis v. Sheahan, No. 05-2575, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10526, at *19–20 (7th Cir. May 16, 2008) (holding that an interactive process is
mandatory but not an independent cause of action); Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., No. 072065, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8380, at *12 (8th Cir. Apr. 18, 2008) (holding that an interactive
process is mandatory and failure to engage in such a process is evidence of bad faith); Freadman v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Fire Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 104 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that an interactive
process is mandatory); Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2007) (same);
Kleiber v. Honda, 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078,
1088 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 380 F.3d 751, 771–72 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that an interactive process is mandatory though not an independent cause of action;
further holding that there is no liability if reasonable accommodation is not possible); Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an interactive process
is mandatory); Kitchen v. Summers Continuous Care Ctr., LLC., No. 5:06-00022, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38419, at *15 (S.D. W. Va. May 12, 2008) (holding that an interactive process is mandatory
but not an independent cause of action; further holding that there is no liability if reasonable
accommodation is not possible). But see Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that an interactive process is not mandatory); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge,
Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that use of an interactive process is subject
to case-by-case assessment).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2008).
26. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (“The accommodation . . . does not have to be the ‘best’
accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the
individual . . . . If more than one of these accommodations will enable the individual to perform the
essential functions . . . the preference of the individual with a disability should be given primary
consideration. However, the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to
choose between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive accommodation or
the accommodation that is easier for it to provide.”).
27. See Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species
Functioning” in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 225–58 (2006).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (discussing modifications to the physical workplace environment, jobrestructuring, and other workplace-specific alterations); see also Bagenstos, The Future of Disability
Law, supra note 19, at 42.
29. See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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of the ninety-four percent of ADA plaintiffs who lose their cases at the
federal district court level arguably cannot satisfy the disability threshold
requirement.30 This difficulty stems from narrow judicial interpretation
of the ADA in several areas31 as well as judicial confusion about the role
of normal functioning in disability analysis.32 The recent ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA)33 seeks to address these problems by
broadening the disability threshold test and requiring that courts assess
individuals for disability in a pre-mitigated state—that is, before the use
of drugs, devices, or other measures to improve functioning34—rather
than after the use of such ameliorative measures.35 The Amendments
leave a number of issues unresolved, however. The U.S. Supreme Court
often looks to outcomes rather than methods of functioning to determine
disability—so if an individual functions atypically but effectively
without legally recognized mitigating measures, she may not be
30. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100, 110–26, 133–37, 145–50, 153–56 (1999) (discussing the frequent use of
summary judgment and the failure to defer to EEOC regulations that are favorable to establishing
disability). This statistic does not account for the success of the ADA as measured by settlements
and other informal arrangements. See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the
ADA Work? 59 ALA. L. REV. 305 (2008).
31. The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the disability threshold test, that is, whether
one is “substantially limited in a major life activity.” See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) (finding that a factory worker who cannot perform “‘repetitive
work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder level . . . for extended periods of time’”
but who is able to complete a number of household tasks is not substantially limited in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks under the ADA).
The Court also reads restrictively both “substantial” and “major life activity.” In Toyota, the
Court held that the test for whether a function is a major life activity is whether it is of “central
importance to most people’s daily lives.” 534 U.S. at 197–98. An individual is “substantially
limited” if she is “unable to perform . . . [or is] [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner,
or duration under which [she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the
average person in the general population[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2008). In four of the last five
major cases addressing the meaning of “substantial,” the Court found for the defendant. Compare
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184 (not “substantially limited” because the plaintiff is not “severely
restrict[ed]”), and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (not “substantially
limited”), and Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (same), and Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (same), with Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
(“substantially limited”).
32. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27.
33. The Act was signed into law on September 25, 2008, and will take effect January 1, 2009.
AAA § 8.
34. Id. § 4(a). See infra note 125 for a list of mitigating measures.
35. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471 (not disabled using eyeglasses); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at
555 (not disabled when brain compensates for monocular vision); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 516 (not
disabled when medicated for severe hypertension).
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considered disabled.36 For example, an individual with severe carpal
tunnel syndrome who completes office tasks may not be viewed as
disabled, even though she works substantially longer hours than other
employees to rest her hands periodically. Further, as addressed in Part II,
the AAA does not address individuals who are vulnerable to disability
given certain environmental changes, nor does it remedy the
fragmentation of disability protections under the current civil rights
approach.
The limitations of the ADA prompted some commentators to suggest
that a civil rights or an antidiscrimination approach to disability
discrimination—an approach for which activists fought for twenty years
prior to the enactment of the ADA—may not adequately address
disability discrimination.37 Some critics advocate a social welfare model
that ADA activists struggled to avoid, namely, a model focused on
material supports for disabled individuals.38 A social welfare approach is
based on compensation for disability, rather than social change to
accommodate disability.39 It does not ground equality of participation as
a formal right, though it does address the need for material resources
such as wage, health, transportation, and other social supports. In other
words, the social welfare approach focuses on eligibility for benefits
rather than on antidiscrimination.40 This type of approach underlies
Social Security disability benefits.41
36. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 243–48.
37. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1212–25 (2007) (appealing to a human rights paradigm); Bagenstos, The
Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70 (appealing to social welfare models); Diller,
supra note 10, at 38–47 (noting limitations of the civil rights model).
38. See, Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70; William G. Johnson,
The Future of Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights? 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 160, 170–72 (1997); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A PostIntegrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 940–56 (2000).
The tension between the social welfare and antidiscrimination models addressed in this Article is
related to debates in other literatures, namely those between substantive and formal equality (actual
equality versus sameness treatment), result and rule orientation (outcome versus procedural
fairness), and distributive and formal justice (redistribution of material goods versus sameness
treatment).
39. See ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN & MARY B. MAHOWALD, DISABILITY,
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES OF JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 74–76
(1998).
40. Johnson, supra note 38, at 161–63.
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 705–08 (2000), is also viewed as embracing a social welfare approach to disability to the extent
that the Act seeks to compensate the disabled worker through rehabilitation rather than altering the
disabling environment. The Act is now “read through” ADA jurisprudence. See 29 C.F.R. §
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While advocates of the social welfare model do not argue for the
abandonment of the ADA, they suggest that disability discrimination
cannot be addressed without focusing on the issue of lack of material
supports.42 This premise both understates and overstates the problem. It
overstates it in the sense that some of the pressing issues facing disabled
persons—such as difficulty in qualifying for the protected class or
receiving a preferred accommodation—are not addressed by material
supports if disability protection, including accommodation, remains tied
to protected class status. These issues must be addressed within the civil
rights framework. It understates matters in the sense that access to some
material supports, such as health care, is not a disability discrimination
issue but one of general social welfare.
This Article argues that reforming disability law requires a blend of
the civil rights and social welfare models as informed by a novel lens:
vulnerability as universal and constant. Part I interprets and applies for
the first time to disability law Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis,
which proffers this view of vulnerability. Fineman argues that
vulnerability is part of the human experience, and the state must develop
structures to address substantive inequality and disadvantage.43 Applying
Fineman’s theory, I argue that vulnerability to disability and the
vulnerabilities of disabled persons are universal and constant. All human
beings are vulnerable to disability, and, when disabled, our
vulnerabilities are often the basis for discrimination. These
vulnerabilities are constant and exist across environments.
Part II uses these insights to critique the current antidiscrimination
approach to disability law reform. Section A discusses the limitations of
viewing disability as an identity category rather than as a part of the
human condition. In Section B, I develop a new concept that I term
“fragmenting disability protection.” The current civil rights approach
treats susceptibility to disability discrimination as situational or limited
to a particular environment in the public realm instead of as extending
1614.203 (2008) (“The standards used to determine whether section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. 791), has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under Titles
I and V (sections 501 through 504 and 510) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 12101, 12111, 12201), as such sections relate to employment. These standards
are set forth in the Commission’s ADA regulations at 29 CFR part 1630.”).
42. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70; see also Samuel
Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t End It, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Samuel Estreicher & Michael Ashley Stein, eds., forthcoming), permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n42.pdf.
43. Nonhuman animals may, of course, also experience disability.
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across environments in both the public and private spheres.
Part III employs the concept of universal vulnerability to advocate a
blend of the civil rights and social welfare models to address the current
inequities in the legal and social responses to disability. To address
barriers to unemployment and desired accommodations, Section A
advocates the expansion of the reasonable accommodation mandate,
supported by government subsidy. Individuals will receive
accommodations that facilitate employment by enabling them to
function across environments. This proposal entails a social welfare
approach to accommodation but leaves in place the requirement of
protected class status. Section B advocates the application of
vulnerability theory to its fullest extent by arguing for a social welfare
approach to health care to address universal vulnerability to illness. The
differences in the approaches are based largely on practical
considerations, and my position is in no way intended to discourage
efforts to protect the vulnerability of workers who are not disabled.
I.

DISABILITY AND UNIVERSAL VULNERABILITY

This Part discusses legal scholar Martha Fineman’s theory of
vulnerability, namely that vulnerability is universal and constant.44 After
interpreting her theory, I apply it for the first time in legal scholarship to
disability. All individuals possess a universal vulnerability to disability,
and disabled individuals have other universal vulnerabilities that they
may experience more acutely, which are constant and extend across their
home, work, and social environments. Fineman’s theory lends support to
the concept I develop in Part II that the current approach to disability
discrimination, which focuses on discrete environments rather than the
experience of disability more generally, fragments disability protections.
I argue in Part III that Fineman’s theory has implications for the civil
rights model of disability as well as for social supports for disabled and
nondisabled individuals; it informs the mixed civil rights and social
welfare model I advocate in that Part.

44. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
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Fineman’s Vulnerability Thesis

Fineman’s theory of universal vulnerability has four premises: (1)
vulnerability is universal and constant;45 (2) vulnerability is not situated
in the body alone, that is, it may be the product of economic,
institutional, and other social harm;46 (3) disadvantage (including
discrimination)47 that results from vulnerability is best addressed by
moving past identity categories,48 including protected classes;49 and (4)
both state and private actors must address vulnerability.50 Fineman’s
vulnerability thesis is a critique of formal equality, which provides the
same opportunities to privileged and to disadvantaged groups as opposed
to addressing substantive inequalities embedded within legal structures.
Antidiscrimination mandates such as the ADA embrace formal equality.
Fineman’s concept of vulnerability is that it is a “universal, inevitable,
enduring aspect of the human condition.”51 All individuals are
vulnerable, in the sense that they have the potential to become
dependent.52 Her concept is similar to that used in international human
rights instruments, which are framed in terms of shared vulnerabilities
rather than specific deprivations and dependencies.53 In the human rights
context, “vulnerability” is exposed by a “simultaneous increase in

45. Id. at 1.
46. Id. at 9–10.
47. Fineman prefers to speak in terms of “disadvantage” instead of “discrimination,” as she
believes the former better captures the ills of privilege. Id. at 16. Further, “discrimination” invokes
the protected class status of formal equality that she rejects as harmful to the very individuals it is
designed to protect. Fineman acknowledges, however, that disadvantage may give rise to
discrimination. Id. at 44 n.7 (“I acknowledge that discrimination does exist, and I do recognize that .
. . personal characteristics might work to complicate the experience of vulnerability for any
individual. My claim is merely that discrimination models based on identity characteristics will not
produce circumstances of greater equality and may in fact lead to less in many circumstances.”)
(emphasis added).
48. Identity categories result from grouping individuals socially, culturally, or politically; gender,
race, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, and disability may be viewed as identity categories.
49. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 4.
50. Id. at 19–22.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 12.
53. See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, art. VIII, UNESCO G.C.
Res.,
33/24,
U.N.
Doc.
C/Res/33/24
(Oct.
19,
2005),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1883&URL _DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=
201.html (discussing “human vulnerability”), permanent copy available at http://
www.law.washington.edu /wlr/notes/83washlrev513n53.pdf.
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threats” and a “weakening of coping mechanisms.”54 This differs from
the common use of “vulnerability” to describe the dependencies of
particular groups or populations: individuals with malaria in SubSaharan Africa, people institutionalized with mental illness, or persons
of young or advanced age, for example.55
Fineman eschews the “liberal subject”—who is viewed as a fully
functioning adult56—and favors a “vulnerable subject,” who may have
social, economic, or biological limitations.57 Every individual is
constantly vulnerable to the possibility of impairment, though the
ontology of their impairments may differ. State institutions are
vulnerable to corruption, capture, and decline, according to Fineman,
and the state must guard against this and respond when necessary.58
The vulnerabilities of the liberal subject are currently addressed by
our legal structures only in particular contexts. For example, laws protect
certain disadvantaged groups from discrimination. Fineman argues that
this context-specific approach not only limits the reach of protections for
universal vulnerabilities, it also fails to address existing inequalities
embedded within legal and social structures, such as wage disparities
and stigma.59 Further, current laws are framed with reference to a subject
whose vulnerabilities, due to existing social supports or serendipity,
never manifest themselves as dependencies.60 Those who require
additional health care, wage supports, or environmental adaptations to
function are disadvantaged by a system that views their needs as
exceptional (requiring something akin to affirmative action),61 rather
54. Peader Kirby, Roundtable Discussion with Bryan S. Turner & Peadar Kirby, Vulnerable
Populations Speaker Series, Emory University School of Law (Apr. 17, 2008); see also PEADAR
KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ch. 3 (2006) (discussing
the evolution of the term “vulnerability” in the international context).
55. Fineman makes a similar point. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 8.
56. The concept of the liberal subject is informed by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which
separates the individual from the external world (the subject/object distinction). Rawls famously
describes the liberal subject at an original or neutral position, unaware of her social lot in life. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19–21 (1971). Rawl’s subject is “[a] normally active and fully
cooperating member[] of society over a complete life,” or perceived as healthy over a lifetime. John
Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 168 (Amartya Sen
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
57. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 11–12.
58. Id. at 12–13. Fineman questions, for example, the robust legal structures that further corporate
practice and distribute wealth to few. Id. at 20–22.
59. Id. at 15–18.
60. Id. at 15–16.
61. See, e.g., James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights
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than as a manifestation of the human condition.62 The current legal
scheme results in double jeopardy for some: individuals are
disadvantaged by the realization of certain vulnerabilities, and they are
consequently denied or provided limited assistance because their needs
are viewed as exceptional.63
Fineman’s response to the vulnerable subject and the vulnerable state
is to move past formal equality and identity categories toward a strong
state with structures that support vulnerabilities as universal.64 She views
the state as obligated to develop structures from which every person will
benefit.65 She provides, by way of example, the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution, which was enacted prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.66 The
Common Benefits Clause states that the role of the government is “for
the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any
single person, family, or set of persons.”67 This provision was used by
the Supreme Court of Vermont to extend the legal benefits enjoyed by
opposite-sex married couples to same-sex couples.68 Individuals in
Vermont are entitled to the benefits because they are citizens of the state,
not because they are part of a protected class as we commonly
understand it.69
Fineman’s arguments for framing state responsibility significantly
advance academic discourse about government response to
disadvantage, including discrimination. Fineman’s focus on vulnerability
as universal and constant redefines the relationship between the state and
the individual. The state’s role is expanded beyond addressing specific
dependencies of some protected groups to responding to the
Concepts has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005).
62. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 17–18.
63. See, e.g., Ani B. Satz, The Limits of Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1451, 1483 (2008)
(discussing the double jeopardy of individuals with poor health status or in advanced age who are
disadvantaged by rationing schemes); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text.
64. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 19–22. Fineman argues that
“[v]ulnerability . . . freed from its limited and negative associations is a powerful conceptual tool
with the potential to define an obligation for the state to ensure a richer and more robust guarantee
of equality than is currently afforded under the equal protection model.” Id. at 8–9.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 22–23.
69. Id. at 23.
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vulnerability of every individual regardless of whether financial, social,
or physical impairments rise to dependency. The role of the state and its
institutions is to provide resilience to vulnerable individuals.70 When
legal and social institutions are structured to address universal
vulnerability, the citizen and the state have a tighter, continuous, and
evolving relationship.
Thus, Fineman’s vulnerability thesis bears directly on the
public/private distinction, or the question of when and under what
constraints the state may act. The state regulates only what is deemed to
be public, such as markets and some aspects of civic life.71 When it
comes to addressing vulnerability, the state is currently assumed to be
non-interventionist. State intervention to address impairments to
functioning outside the marketplace is considered an intrusion into the
private realm. Fineman’s view of vulnerability as universal and constant
illuminates the difficulty with this distinction, namely, that vulnerability
does not end when one leaves the public realm (or particular parts of the
public arena).
Fineman envisions the state reasserting itself to address universal
vulnerabilities as well as the dependencies of those whose vulnerabilities
are realized. She argues that the law should move past identity categories
and antidiscrimination mandates toward addressing shared, constant
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may be biological, social, or
economic, and require social supports.
B.

Universal Vulnerabilities to Disability and for Disabled Persons

This Part situates Fineman’s vulnerability theory within the existing
antidiscrimination critique and applies it to disability. Unlike previous
commentators, Fineman stresses the need for an interventionist state to
address universal vulnerability. Fineman moves beyond focusing on the
vulnerabilities of target groups and removes private firms as gatekeepers
of accommodation. Her vulnerability thesis applies to vulnerability to
disability as well as to individuals with realized vulnerabilities that result
in disability. Disabled individuals may have heightened vulnerabilities
associated with their impairments and be disadvantaged by
discrimination on the basis of those vulnerabilities.
70. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 13 (citing PEADAR KIRBY,
VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE (2006)).
71. MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 38–39,
208 (2004).
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Situating Vulnerability Theory Within Existing Antidiscrimination
Critique

Before applying Fineman’s vulnerability thesis to disability, it is
necessary to place her theory within the existing critique of the civil
rights approach to disability discrimination. Fineman does not address
disability directly. Rather, she provides a more general critique of the
formal equality or antidiscrimination approach to human vulnerability.72
Fineman is critical of a formal equality approach, which focuses on
equal treatment, on three grounds. First, sameness treatment does not
consider or address structural inequalities; people are treated in a like
manner under existing laws and practices that entrench inequalities.73
Second, formal equality results in a “withering state,”74 as corporate and
other private interests limit the role and ability of the government to
address inequalities.75 As Fineman states, under the formal equality
paradigm “the state minimally supervises . . . institutions in fulfilling
their essential role in providing assets that give us resilience in the face
of vulnerability.”76 Third, formal equality excludes those with
vulnerabilities who are not part of a protected class.77 Additionally,
Fineman cautions that expanding the protected class may serve as “a
justification for abandoning the pursuit of substantive equality,” or
addressing the structural issues contributing to disadvantage.78 While
this is an empirical claim, it underscores the possible dangers of
addressing disability discrimination by sameness treatment.
Disability scholarship discussing the inherent limitations of the civil
rights approach identifies similar issues, though not necessarily in
Fineman’s terms. Formal equality for disabled individuals under the
ADA means being treated like individuals who do not have a
disability.79 While this may involve accommodation, scholars and
72. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 2.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Fineman defines the “state” as “an organized and official set of linked institutions that
together hold coercive power, including the ability to make and enforce mandatory legal rules, and
which is legitimated by claim to public authority. In form the ‘state’ could be locally, nationally,
transnationally, or internationally organized.”). Id. at 6 n.14.
75. Id. at 5–6.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 3, 5.
78. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 20.
79. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 61, at 45–46; Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra
note 19, at 37 (speaking of an “access/content distinction”: disabled individuals have access to the
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activists recognize that formal equality does not address the structural
inequities that limit disabled individuals in work and civic life.80
Further, commentators acknowledge the “withering state” in a narrow
sense, namely, the ADA and its supporting regulations limit the federal
government’s role in promoting equality because the reasonable
accommodation provision is interpreted as an antidiscrimination
mandate.81 There is little to no federal funding of accommodations,82 and
the federal government generally does not interfere with the
accommodations made by state and local governments or private parties
so long as they are reasonable.83
Scholarship focused on extending the protected class and the AAA
purport to address the arguments contained within Fineman’s last
critique: the exclusion of those with vulnerabilities from legal
protections.84 As I argue in Part II.A, however, expanding the protected
class cannot resolve some of the limitations of the identity category
approach to addressing discrimination. Individuals with vulnerabilities
from impairments that do not rise to the level of disabilities will remain
unprotected.

same benefits as individuals who are not disabled, though the content of the benefit is not altered to
meet the needs of disabled individuals).
80. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 42–50; Michael Ashley
Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2007).
81. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 43 (2006); Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40; Stein &
Stein, supra note 37, at 1210–11.
82. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. State sovereign immunity may be abrogated
when states fail to make disability accommodations that support basic constitutional rights. See
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (holding that Title II abrogates state sovereign
immunity when conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (holding that Title II abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the fundamental
right of access to courts).
84. See, e.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the
ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 373-74 (2000); Cheryl L. Anderson,
“Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83
(2000); Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of
the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405
(1999). Michael Stein’s scholarship regarding disability as a human right is a notable exception, as
he acknowledges that the “group classified as ‘disabled’ often overlaps significantly with other
socially marginalized groups . . . . This connection underscores the universality of disability, both as
a human rights issue and as part of the human experience.” Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1240.
Stein refers to the universality of disability, whereas Fineman is concerned with vulnerability.
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Applying Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory to Disability

Fineman’s theory has clear applications to the disability context, both
in terms of thinking about the disabled subject and the state’s response to
vulnerability to impairment. To begin, a vulnerable subject may become
a disabled subject. Vulnerability to disability (and other impairments) is
universal and constant; we are all one curb step away from disability.85
We are susceptible to disability as part of the human condition.
An individual becomes disabled when certain vulnerabilities are
realized. A disabled individual remains vulnerable to further disability
and may experience particular vulnerabilities more acutely:
“[u]ndeniably universal, human vulnerability is . . . particular [and] is
experienced uniquely by each of us . . . .”86 Thus, the vulnerable subject
differs from the dominant conception of a liberal subject, who is viewed
as a normal, fully functioning adult.87 The vulnerable subject exists at
various life stages and with a spectrum of possible abilities, including
impairments to functioning.88
Fineman’s conception of the vulnerable subject reveals that the
current approach to disability discrimination based on protected class
membership ignores the possible shared benefits of facilitating a variety
of means of functioning. The ADA focuses on independence rather than
dependence or interdependence (shared dependence) of individuals.89
85. I borrow this expression from a conversation with Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Professor of
Women’s Studies, Emory University.
86. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 10.
87. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The concept of the vulnerable subject overcomes a
limitation in Martha Nussbaum’s work addressing obligations to disabled persons. Under
Nussbaum’s capabilities model, disabled individuals with profound impairments may not be able to
realize the capabilities she suggests a state must maximize for each individual to promote human
dignity. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 76–78, 179–81, 192–93 (2006); see also
Stein, Disability Human Rights, supra note 80, at 105 (discussing this limitation of Nussbaum’s
theory).
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)–(9) (2000) (stressing the need to eliminate dependency and
to promote independent living); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing Before
H. Subcomm. on Public Works and Transport., 101st Cong. 13, 14 (1989) (statement of Roland
Moss); id. at 89 (statement of David M. Capozzi); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 8 (1989) (statement of Hon. Steve
Bartlett); id. at 44–47, 51 (statement of Judith Comfort); id. at 47, 61–63 (statement of Robert
Mosbacher); id. at 96–98 (statement of Dr. William A. Spencer); id. at 133, 149 (statement of Kathy
Wingen); id. at 278–79, 284 (statement of Oral O. Miller); id. at 504, 507, 510 (statement of Robert
M. Werth). The ADA of 1990 is based on a publication of the National Council of the Handicapped.
See TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES—WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986).
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The reason for this may be the ADA’s concentration on an
independence–(inter)dependence rather than a vulnerability–resilience
dichotomy. While some commentators in disability studies view
interdependence as a beneficial way to view the implications of
disability,90 others view it as potentially harmful to speak of disability in
terms of interdependence, as it may invoke pity and other negative
sentiments.91 Focusing on shared vulnerability and resilience advances
the discussion.
Appealing to universal vulnerabilities removes the stigma of needing
assistance and improves protections for all, eliminating backlash by
those who would otherwise fail to receive protections. In contexts such
as health care and employment, it may not make sense to speak of a
protected class.92 Consider the similar vulnerabilities of disabled,
minority, and at-will employees, in terms of heightened vulnerability to
termination and barriers to re-entering the workforce.93 An even stronger
analogy may be made between individuals with impairments that do not
rise to the level of disability and the vulnerabilities of individuals in
these other categories. As Matthew Diller notes, “[I]f the plaintiffs’
impairments do not appear serious enough, then there is no basis for
distinguishing them from the general mass of workers who are subject to
the vicissitudes of at-will employment and [for] grant[ing] [plaintiffs]
the ‘benefit’ of accommodation and protection from discharge.”94
Similar arguments may be made in the health care context, as everyone
benefits from broad, affordable coverage, given universal vulnerability
to illness and other impairments requiring medical attention.
Perhaps most importantly, however, Fineman argues for a strong state
to address universal vulnerabilities. This view sheds light on a current
limitation of disability scholarship: disability literature focuses much
attention on the role of the employer, but not the state, in addressing the
vulnerabilities of disabled workers.95 The impact of the state is assumed
90. See, e.g., SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
145 (1996).

ON DISABILITY

91. See, e.g., SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 103.
92. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 14 (arguing that her theory of universal
vulnerability applies to education, health, and employment systems).
93. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 10, at 47 (“If differential and individualized treatment
[under the reasonable accommodation mandate] is necessary for the establishment of equal
opportunity for people with disabilities, it may also be necessary for other groups.”).
94. Id. at 49–50.
95. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 43–44, 47.
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as a constant, and immense pressure is applied to employers to address
structural inequalities affecting disabled employees.96
This approach seems both a Sisyphean effort and an unjust request. It
is Sisyphean because employers are asked to change their practices
within a system that privileges employers in terms of influence on
workplace practices and wealth. It may be, as Catherine Albiston and
others argue, that small alterations from the ground up in employment
will address some (local) structural inequalities for disabled workers, but
this seems unlikely to bring about effective, systemic change.97 Further,
it may be unjust, as some conscientious employers may bear an immense
burden to address structural inequalities, while others gain economically
from not improving practices. If the state restructures its legal
institutions to consider adequately the universal vulnerabilities of
disabled employees, employers will share the same obligations. A topdown approach also affords uniformity in practice.
While Fineman’s theory seeks to present an alternative to an
antidiscrimination approach such as the ADA, it provides insights about
how a civil rights model might be improved. Fineman’s
conceptualization of vulnerability supports the argument that it does not
make sense to view the vulnerabilities associated with disability as
arising within discrete environments under any paradigm. Vulnerability
does not end when one leaves a movie theater, a workplace, or a
commuter train; vulnerability based on impairments to functioning is
universal and constant. Part II examines the limits of the current
antidiscrimination approach to disability, focusing on the requirement of
protected class membership and the fragmentation of disability
protections by a civil rights approach that views vulnerability as
situational.
II.

THE LIMITS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION

This Part discusses the limitations of the current civil rights approach
to disability discrimination in terms of reliance on disability as an

96. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4 (“The challenge for civil rights
advocates, then, is not to devise new doctrines so much as it is to convince judges and the broader
political community that employers should be held responsible for structural problems of workplace
inequality when they are not taking sufficient steps to counteract those problems.”).
97. Catherine R. Albiston, The Institutional Context of Civil Rights, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Montreal, Canada (May 30, 2008) (discussing a
forthcoming monograph); see also Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4.
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identity category and the fragmentation of disability protections. Identity
categories result from grouping individuals socially, culturally, or
politically. The ADA recognizes disabled persons as part of a protected
class rather than viewing disability as an aspect of the human
experience.98 Thus, as in the gender, race, and religion contexts,
protections for disabled individuals against discrimination are contingent
upon protected class membership.
The concept of fragmenting disability protections is a novel critique
of antidiscrimination law. Protections for class members are fragmented
when the vulnerabilities associated with disability are viewed as arising
within discrete environments—such as the workplace, the local shopping
mall, or the public library—rather than existing continuously across
environments. Conceptualizing the experience of disability as
fragmented, rather than as constant and part of the human condition, is
perhaps the most significant barrier to addressing disability
discrimination under the current civil rights approach.
This Part adds to the existing critique of the antidiscrimination
approach to disability law in two ways. First, I demonstrate that the
limitations of class membership for disabled individuals are inherent
constraints of the civil rights approach, rather than an issue of
implementation of the ADA. Many scholars,99 and indeed the authors
and supporters of the AAA,100 suggest that construing the definition of
disability to include more persons with impairments will substantially
address the barriers to disability protection. I recognize identity
categories as a limitation of the civil rights approach that cannot be
remedied by judicial or legislative adjustments to the ADA. However
broadly the protected class is defined, it will necessarily exclude
individuals with impairments that do not meet the disability threshold
test. Restricted membership in the protected class suggests that disability
law reform requires a mixed social and civil rights approach to address
98. The AAA, however, strikes 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), which states in part that “individuals
with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). See also infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability
Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition
of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000).
100. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. E1376 (daily ed. June 26, 2008) (statement of Rep. Capps) (cosponsor); 154 CONG. REC. H6083-84 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
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the vulnerabilities associated with some biological impairments.
Second, I develop the concept of fragmenting disability protections as
a critique of the current civil rights approach. The ADA assumes that the
vulnerabilities associated with biological impairments may be addressed
within particular environments in the public realm, such as the
workplace,101 transportation,102 and places of public accommodation,103
thus failing to account for the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals
while moving between and outside these environments. Viewing
vulnerability as situational results in interrupted protections on two
fronts. To start, accommodations within the public realm are limited to
discrete contexts. Take a simple illustration: under current ADA case
law, a Deaf person must be able to enter a movie theater,104 but there is
no requirement that she be able to view a film with captioning.105
Further, accommodations within the private realm that facilitate entry
into the public domain are not addressed by the ADA. For example, the
Act does not speak to accommodations at home that are necessary for an
employee to complete vital personal tasks necessary to maintain a
routine work schedule, such as personal grooming, laundry, and meal
preparation.
Fragmented protections do not adequately respond to the
vulnerabilities associated with disability. Disabled citizens may be
directly denied meaningful access to services in the public realm, as in
the theater example. Disabled individuals may also be indirectly denied
access to opportunities in the public realm when they lack
accommodations in the private sphere that facilitate entry into the public
domain, such as into the workforce. Viewing vulnerability as situational
also makes it difficult to identify and to address structural inequalities
such as wage inequities and stigma. This is because these inequities
involve social discrimination that is not bounded by the contexts upon
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
102. Id. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12182(b)(2)(B), 12184.
103. Id. §§ 12181–89.
104. Id. § 12181(7)(C) (covering “motion picture house”).
105. See, e.g., Todd v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. H-02-1944, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25317, at
*13–15 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2003) (holding that installing closed captioning, which is viewable only
to those who choose it, poses an undue burden on defendant theaters); Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas,
Inc., No. 00-173-AS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7025, at *15–22 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2002) (holding that
there is no obligation under the regulations to provide either closed captioning or open captioning,
which is visible to all in a theater). But see Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126–32
(D.D.C. 2003) (approving a joint motion for settlement providing closed captioning).
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which the law focuses. Stigma against disabled workers, for example,
usually does not originate within the place of employment but travels
into the work environment from familial or social contexts.
A.

Disability as an Identity Category

Much is written in critical legal scholarship about the value of identity
categories and their relation to legal rights.106 I do not in this brief
Section intend to take a position in the debate about whether identity
categories—groups of individuals based on social, cultural, or political
affiliation—promote or hinder rights overall. My argument is simple:
The civil rights approach to disability discrimination is inherently
limited because it requires viewing disability as an identity category.
The requirement of class membership necessarily excludes some
individuals with impairments from disability protections. Thus, while
expanding the definition of disability with the AAA or through judicial
construction may protect more individuals with disabilities, it does not
adequately address the vulnerabilities of individuals outside the
protected class. These individuals must turn to other legal structures to
address their vulnerabilities.
At a basic level, a civil rights approach requires creating a protected
class of individuals. Prior to the AAA, disabled individuals were
considered part of a “discrete and insular minority”107 as members of
protected classes are viewed in the race, religion, and national origin
contexts.108 The source of discrimination (impairments, for disabled
persons) had to be immutable109 or consist of “characteristics that are
beyond [the individual’s] control.”110 While the AAA strikes this
language,111 it retains the disability threshold test for class membership
requiring that an individual be “substantially limit[ed]” in “one or more
major life activities,” have “a record of such an impairment,” or “be[]
106. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1999); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY
FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
108. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
109. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
110. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(7).
111. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008).
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regarded as having such an impairment.”112
Thus, disabled individuals bear a unique burden under the civil rights
paradigm, in the sense that they must prove that they qualify for
membership in the protected class. The U.S. Supreme Court limited
class membership by imposing strict tests for “substantially”113 and
“major life activities”114 as well as assessing individuals for disability
after they employed drugs and devices that mitigated the effects of
impairment.115 Individuals “regarded as” disabled also had to show that
their perceived disability, if actual, would substantially limit a major life
activity.
The AAA makes clear that the disability threshold test is not meant to
be overly restrictive. Given the recent nature of the amendments, it is
worth describing their effect on class membership in some detail. The
Rules of Construction state that “[t]he definition of disability in this Act
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this
Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”116 The
AAA further states that “the primary object of attention in cases brought
under the ADA should be whether entities . . . have complied with their
obligations,” and it cautions that the question of “whether an
individual’s impairment is a disability . . . should not demand extensive
analysis.”117 The AAA also strikes the language in the preamble to the
ADA that “some 43,000,000 million Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities”118 (cited in the 1990 Supreme Court
trilogy narrowly interpreting the disability threshold test).119

112. Id. § 4.
113. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (“substantially” is to
be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled”).
114. Id. at 198 (an impairment “must . . . prevent[] or severely restrict[] the individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”).
115. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–89 (1999) (not disabled using
eyeglasses); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (not disabled when
medicated for severe hypertension); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999)
(not disabled when brain compensates for monocular vision).
116. AAA § 4(a).
117. Id. § 2(b)(5).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); AAA § 3.
119. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488–89 (holding that twin sisters with severe myopia are not disabled);
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding that a mechanic who manages his severe hypertension with drugs
is not disabled); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565–66 (holding that a truck driver with monocular vision
is not disabled).
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Specifically, the AAA:
• Requires a court to assess an individual for class membership in
an unmitigated state,120
• Appeals to the EEOC to develop a broader reading of
“substantially” in light of its Rules of Construction,121
• Broadens the scope of “major life activity,”122 and
• Reverts to a broader reading of “regarded as disabled.”123
Perhaps the most fundamental change to class membership is that an
individual is assessed in an unmitigated state prior to using drugs,
devices, or other tools to promote functioning.124 The AAA provides an
extensive, nonexclusive list of ameliorative measures that are not to be
considered when assessing an individual for class membership.125 An
exception is made for individuals using “ordinary eyeglasses or contact
lenses.”126 These individuals are to be assessed after their vision is
corrected; employers may terminate them for failing to meet vision
acuity requirements only if such qualifications are “job-related” and
“consistent with business necessity.”127

120. AAA §§ 2(b)(2), 4(a).
121. Id. §§ 2(b)(4)–(6).
122. Id. §§ 2(b)(4), 4(a).
123. Id. § 2(b)(3) (returning to the standard articulated in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 282–86 (1987)).
124. This is consistent with the original EEOC regulations, which were disregarded by the Court
in its 1990 trilogy of cases. The Court argued that the EEOC did not have authority to issue
regulations with regard to the definition of disability, which is located in the introductory material to
the ADA and outside its titles. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. While the AAA specifically grants rulemaking authority to the EEOC with regard to the definition of disability, it fails to discuss deference
to agency regulations. See AAA § 6(a)(2).
125. “Mitigating measures” include:
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not
include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing
aids, and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen
therapy equipment and supplies; (II) use of assistive technology; (III) reasonable
accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.
AAA § 4(a). “Auxiliary aids and services” are defined as
(A) qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials
available to individuals with hearing impairments; (B) qualified readers, taped texts, or other
effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual
impairments; (C) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; (D) and other similar
services and actions.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 5(b).
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The AAA also seeks to expand the protected class by articulating a
more liberal reading of “substantial” and “major life activity.” The Act
explicitly rejects the standard put forth in Toyota Motor Manufacturing
of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,128 that an individual must be “severely
restrict[ed] . . . from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people’s daily lives.”129 While the AAA leaves the task of
reinterpreting “substantially” to the EEOC,130 it demonstrates by way of
example how broadly major life activities are to be interpreted; it
provides an extensive list of relevant activities, including “working” and
“major bodily functions.”131 Further, the AAA includes episodic or inremission impairments that would qualify as disabilities when active.132
This covers a large number of conditions that previously encountered
mixed judicial treatment, such as epilepsy, cancer, and multiple
sclerosis.133 In addition, the Act clarifies that an individual need be
impaired in only one major life activity.134
With respect to individuals who are “regarded as disabled,”
individuals meet the Act’s threshold test even if they cannot show that if
they actually had the condition at issue, they would be impaired in a
major life activity.135 In addition, the AAA alters the meaning of a
128. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
129. AAA § 2(b)(4) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 198
(2002)).
130. Id. § 2(b)(4).
131. The AAA states that:
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working . . . . [A] major life
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to,
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.
Id.
132. Id.
133. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (epilepsy). Compare Demming v. Hous. &
Redev. Auth., 66 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (woman with thyroid cancer not disabled under
Rehabilitation Act), and Dinsdale v. Wesley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015, at *13 (N.D. Iowa Apr.
13, 2000) (woman with colon cancer not disabled under ADA after chemotherapy ended), and
Farmer v. Nat’l City Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941, at *16-17 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996) (man
treated for prostate cancer with lingering incontinence and impotence not disabled under ADA),
with EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 823 F. Supp. 571, 572 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1993), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (man with terminal cancer disabled under ADA).
134. AAA § 4(a).
135. Id. The AAA returns to the broad standard articulated in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, a case interpreting the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 705-08 (1998):
“those who are regarded as impaired . . . are substantially limited in a major life activity.” 480 U.S.
273, 284 (1987); see also AAA § 2(b)(3).
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“qualified individual with a disability” from one discriminated against
“because of . . . disability” to one who experiences discrimination “on
the basis of disability.”136 Arguably this change more clearly
encapsulates “regarded as” discrimination. Strengthening the “regarded
as” prong is significant, as it demonstrates in a limited context that
Congress recognizes the importance of treating vulnerability to
impairment (in the sense of disadvantageous treatment) as universal; that
is, both disabled and nondisabled individuals may experience the same
discrimination.
While these changes greatly enhance the ability of individuals to
qualify as disabled, some people with impairments are left unprotected.
For example, individuals who are functional in their current
environments but hyper-vulnerable to impairment by environmental
alteration are not protected, unless they have a qualifying episodic
disability or one that is in remission.137 A disabled individual is hypervulnerable to changes in her environment when she requires certain
environmental supports to function, such as a break room with a
refrigerator in which to store medicine or special meals, a quiet and
unpopulated workspace, or a smoke-free common area in her place of
residence. It is only after an environmental change—such as an
employer turning a break room into a gym and an employee becoming
unable to function in her workplace—that an individual may be eligible
for disability protection. Individuals who are mildly symptomatic or
asymptomatic for disabling illnesses that they have not previously
experienced also are not classified as disabled under the AAA.138

136. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining “qualified individual with a disability”); AAA § 5.
The perceived impairment must be one that would last at least six months, however, if it actually
manifest. Id. § 4(a).
137. AAA § 4(a) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”).
138. Further, it is doubtful courts would construe the AAA to cover these individuals as
“substantially limited” in a major life activity. Prior to the AAA, they were not viewed as such. See,
e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201–03 (2002) (individual with
carpal tunnel syndrome who is largely functional with regard to manual tasks at home is not
disabled); McGuinness v. Univ. N.M. Sch. Med., 170 F.3d 974, 978 (1998) (student whose “anxiety
impairs his ‘academic functioning,’ not his ability to work” fails the disability threshold test).
The relevant “physical or mental impairment” continues to be understood as a condition that is
manifest or was previously present. See AAA § 4(a). There are two exceptions, however.
“Asymptomatic” AIDS was recognized by the Court as a “physical impairment” because of “the
immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected person’s white blood cells and the
severity of the disease.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 635–37 (1998). The Court noted,
however, that “asymptomatic” in this context is a “misnomer . . . for clinical features persist
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Further, membership in the protected class is not sufficient to
establish a claim to a remedy. While the Court seems to combine under
the disability threshold test the question of whether an individual is
disabled with the inquiry about whether she is entitled to a remedy, these
are conceptually distinct inquiries.139 After the AAA, it is possible that
the Court will more clearly separate these questions. The AAA in fact
makes explicit that employers are not required to provide
accommodations to employees who are “regarded as” disabled,140 such
as accommodations for impairments that do not rise to the level of
disability141 or workplace sensitivity training. More generally, however,
by including greater numbers of individuals in the protected class, the
AAA will likely focus more attention on whether accommodations
impose an “undue hardship” on an employer.142 In other words,
protected class membership may no longer serve as the gatekeeper
doctrine for accommodating disability; expanding class membership
may mean that protected class status cannot be equated with a remedy,
even in the narrow situational sense discussed below in Subpart B.
In sum, an antidiscrimination approach to disability necessarily
excludes some individuals with impairments. Further, class membership
does not guarantee a remedy. In Part III, I address the question of how
the state should respond to vulnerability outside the protected class.
While the AAA addresses some of the discrete issues with respect to the
implementation of the ADA, it falls short in two regards. First, the
protected class is not expanded to include individuals who are
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic for disability (that is, they will
throughout, including lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial
infections.” Id. at 635. Individuals with predispositions to genetic conditions are now protected
under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881,
922 (2008).
139. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 248–50.
140. AAA § 6(a)(1). Presumably, discriminatory behavior will be halted and the usual damages
will apply, however.
141. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1228–40 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an individual with vertigo not limited in the major life activity of working may be
entitled to accommodation if “regarded as” disabled); Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an individual who is not disabled but “regarded as” disabled may be
entitled to an accommodation of bringing supplemental oxygen to work).
142. “Undue hardship” is an affirmative defense under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
The statute defines it as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” based on factors
including the cost, the overall resources of the employer or those of its facility or facilities making
the accommodation, and the impact on that employer or facility or facilities. Id. § 12111(10).
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develop disability in the future), or who will be easily disabled by
(hyper-vulnerable to) changes in their environments. Second, as I argue
in the next Subpart, the scope of protections for class members may be
limited by a situational view of the vulnerabilities associated with
disability discrimination.
B.

Disability Law as Fragmenting Disability Protection

This Section presents a new critique of the antidiscrimination
approach to disability discrimination based on what I term “fragmenting
disability protection,” or treating vulnerabilities associated with
impairments as if they arise in discrete environments, such as the
workplace or particular places of public accommodation. This approach
to vulnerability, a function of reasonable accommodation being an
unfunded mandate,143 may be the most significant limitation of a civil
rights approach to disability protection. Generally speaking, it results in
a patchwork of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful
social participation. More specifically, viewing vulnerabilities as
situational creates the false perception that individuals with significant
impairments are not disabled in some environments. In addition, a
situational approach to vulnerability disregards the benefits of
conceptualizing vulnerability as universal for disabled and nondisabled
individuals alike.
1.

Disability and Vulnerability to Discrimination

When our vulnerabilities result in disability, we may become subject
to discrimination.144 As recognized in the original preamble to the ADA,
stereotypical views about disability historically subjected disabled
individuals to “purposeful unequal treatment” and to “political
powerlessness.”145 Disabled individuals experience discrimination based
143. I am grateful to Emory Law Professor Charlie Shanor for his insights on this issue.
144. See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)–(6), which states that:
Congress finds that . . . individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities . . . people with disabilities . . . occupy an inferior status in
our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally.
145. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
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on stereotypes about their abilities146 as well as social environments that
privilege dominant ways of functioning.147 The AAA states that “people
with . . . disabilities are frequently precluded from [fully participating in
society] because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to
remove societal and institutional barriers.”148
One approach to addressing disability discrimination is to consider
the vulnerability of individuals meeting the threshold test in a series of
key environments, or to offer fragmented legal protection. This view
treats vulnerability as attached to a location or function rather than as
inherent in the individual. Individuals are understood to move in and out
of vulnerability as opposed to vulnerability being a constant part of the
human experience.
Another approach is to address the vulnerability associated with
biological impairments more broadly through our legal and social
structures, recognizing that vulnerability is located within individuals
and therefore exists across environments. Vulnerability is part of the
human condition, meaning that all individuals are vulnerable.149
Individuals may become disabled when particular vulnerabilities are
realized, creating the need for accommodation or protection from
discrimination. Legal and social structures either may seek to address
universal vulnerability generally, that is before it becomes realized, or to
address vulnerability after it rises to disability. Currently the only
example of the former approach is the movement toward universal
design, or creating physical environments that accommodate multiple
ways of functioning.150 An example of the latter approach—one that
acknowledges vulnerability as existing across environments but that
requires eligibility for protections—are the Social Security programs for
disabled citizens providing wage and health care supports.151 Universal
design and the Social Security disability programs thus recognize
universal vulnerability to varying degrees.
Current disability antidiscrimination law responds to the
146. See, e.g., id. § 12101(a)(7) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities are . . . relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.”).
147. SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 74.
148. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(2008).
149. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44.
150. See infra notes 226–28 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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vulnerabilities created by disability as if they were situational. Federal
and parallel state laws address vulnerability within isolated contexts for
certain individuals rather than more generally. The ADA covers the
workplace,152 public services,153 places of public accommodation,154 and
transportation.155 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973156 applies to recipients
of federal grants and programs, and litigation under the Act focuses on
contexts similar to those of the public service and employment titles of
the ADA. Similarly, the Fair Housing Act157 and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act158 address discrete contexts.
Protections are complicated further by the fact that the law focuses on
individuals and their disabilities, rather than addressing shared
vulnerabilities among disabled persons. This approach differs from the
one taken with regard to elderly persons, where Social Security and
Medicare are premised in part on the recognition of the high probability
of manifest vulnerability at a certain age without the need for individual
determination of impairment.159 Each of the above-mentioned disability
protection acts requires a case-by-case inquiry for eligibility,160 meaning
the circumstances of each individual (rather than the biological
impairment itself) affect whether she is entitled to disability
protections.161 As a result, the law does not recognize per se disabilities.
Individuals with the same impairments may receive varying legal
treatment, depending on their individual circumstances. Prior to the
AAA, for example, individuals able to increase their functioning through
drugs or devices were not disabled, whereas individuals who failed to
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
153. Id. §§ 12131–34.
154. Id. §§ 12181–89.
155. Id. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12182(b)(2)(B), 12184.
156. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 705–08, amended by ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 7, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008).
157. Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–07 (2000).
158. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2000).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (2000); see also infra note 195.
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (discussing the case-by-case inquiry of the ADA); see also
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). But see U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 403 (2001) (creating an exception to the case-by-case inquiry when disability
accommodation requests interfere with seniority systems created by collective bargaining).
161. Paul Steven Miller refers to the case-by-case inquiry as a “contextual definition of
disability,” in the sense that there are no per se disabilities under the ADA. Miller, Reclaiming the
Vision, supra note 13, at 770 (emphasis added).
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mitigate the same disease with the requisite drugs were disabled.162
While assessing individuals in a pre-mitigated state will allow greater
numbers to qualify as disabled, some circumstances such as individual
fortitude may still result in varying outcomes for individuals with the
same condition.163 Further, with regard to illness, disease expression
(severity) may vary per individual. The next two sections address the
effects of fragmenting disability protection.
2.

Protection Interrupted

As a result of laws treating vulnerability as arising in isolated
transactions rather than as a part of an integrated experience, protections
for disabled individuals are often interrupted, denying meaningful social
participation. Someone may be able to enter a building but not partake in
the services offered, for example.164 In addition, the ADA’s response to
the increased vulnerability to unemployment of disabled individuals is to
address vulnerability only in terms of functioning at the workplace.
Disabled workers are entitled to an accommodation at the worksite or
with regard to work schedules to assist them in completing the essential
functions (fundamental duties)165 of their jobs.166 The Act does not
162. Compare Landry v. United Scaffolding, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 808, 816 (M.D. La. 2004
(holding that plaintiff with epilepsy who controls his seizures with medication is not disabled), and
Roland v. Becon Constr., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19702, at *13 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2002) (holding
that plaintiff with epilepsy who takes medication and experiences seizures only at night is not
disabled), with Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff who suffers seizures while medicated for epilepsy is disabled), and Rowles v. Automated
Prod. Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M. D. Pa. 2000) (finding a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether plaintiff who takes medication for epilepsy and experiences a seizure a year is
disabled). There may, of course, be individuals so profoundly impaired that they would be disabled
in any circumstance.
163. The AAA accounts for “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications” as
forms of mitigation. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553,
3555. Fortitude and endurance arguably fall outside this context, however.
164. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
165. EEOC Regulations state: “A job function may be considered essential for any of several
reasons, including but not limited to the following: . . . the reason the position exists is to perform
that function . . . [there are a] limited number of employees available [who can perform that
function] . . . [and] [t]he function [is] highly specialized . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (2008).
Essential functions may be determined by a variety of sources including the employer, written job
descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, the time an employee spends performing the
function, the impact on the workplace of eliminating the function for the relevant employee, and the
past and present work experiences of others. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (defining a “qualified individual with a disability” as one who “with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
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address barriers to employment outside the workplace, such as lack of
transportation to work,167 accommodations that facilitate employment by
aiding a person at work as well as at home,168 and employer-based health
insurance that includes services for mental illness.169
Viewing the vulnerabilities associated with disability as situational in
this way also masks structural inequalities. Disability protections that
target particular aspects of a disabled individual’s life, such as fulfilling
the functions of her job or entering an insurance office, shift legal focus
away from inequalities like wage disparities and health care policies that
disfavor mental disability. Even if these structural inequalities are
identified, the current approach to vulnerability, which seeks to provide
localized remedies, cannot address them.
The consequences of the interrupted protections of the situational
approach to vulnerability have prompted scholars to turn prematurely to
social welfare models to reduce disability discrimination.170 Scholars
argue that it is necessary to appeal to social welfare programs to fill the
gaps in protection, in particular with regard to employment.171 As I argue
in Part III, however, if the vulnerabilities associated with disability and
employment are understood to extend beyond the workplace proper (or
under Titles II and III to include more meaningful access to services and
places of public accommodation), many of the perceived shortcomings
of the civil rights model may be addressed without turning to broad
social welfare programs. For example, entry into the workplace and

that such individual holds or desires”).
167. Transportation to work is generally considered a personal rather than an employment issue.
See, e.g., Self v. Bd. of Review, 453 A.2d 170, 171 (N.J. 1982) (employees who voluntary left their
employment because they were without transportation to work are not entitled to unemployment
compensation).
168. Under the ADA, an employer need not provide an accommodation that benefits the
employee both at home and at work. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“[R]easonable accommodation” means
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and useable . . . job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”).
169. See infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19; Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t
End It, supra note 42; Diller, supra note 10; Johnson, supra note 38; Mark C. Weber, Disability and
the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 889, 940–56 (2000).
171. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19; Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t
End It, supra note 42; Diller, supra note 10; Johnson, supra note 38; Weber, supra note 170, at
940–56.
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disabled worker retention could be facilitated by more reliable
Paratransit and workplace accommodations that benefit the employee at
work as well as have utility at home. To be sure, some vulnerabilities
associated with disability are best addressed by social welfare programs
(I argue this is the case with medical needs), but that is a separate issue
from whether there is more work to be done working within the civil
rights paradigm.
In addition, interrupted protections cause scholars to reexamine and
undervalue the social model of disability, that is, the view that disability
is socially constructed or of environmental origin.172 When disability is
understood to be of environmental origin (social model of disability),
and the relevant environment assessed is narrow (vulnerability as
situational), the social model appears to limit disability protections.173 As
a result, accommodations are restricted because they are made only to
support an individual’s functioning within a particular environment.
The problem, however, is not with the social model of disability, but
with its current application under the ADA. It is the restricted scope of
the environment rather than the concept of disability as socially
constructed, or a civil rights approach more generally, that undermines
protections. Within the civil rights framework, vulnerability to socially
constructed disability may be understood to exist continuously and to
extend across contexts instead of being situational. As argued in Part III,
conceptualizing disability as involving universal vulnerabilities expands
the environments for assessment beyond those related to a discrete
aspect of a form of social participation, such as accommodation at the
worksite, to those relevant for a form of social participation itself, like
employment.

172. See, e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1208–12. The ADA adopts a functional definition
of disability, in the sense that it looks to impairment of a major life activity or function. Because the
definition looks to a “physical or mental impairment” that “substantially limits a major life activity,”
it is often interpreted to be a mixture of the medical and social models of disability. “Impairment” is
determined according to medical criteria, and the limitation of a major life activity considers social
or environmental impediments to functioning. The medical model views disability as a biological
defect (physical or mental impairment) to be ameliorated. See SILVERS, WASSERMAN &
MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 59–63. The social model views disability as environmentally created
and requires social adjustment to facilitate functioning. Id. at 74–76.
173. See, e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1208–12.
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3.

Artificial Restriction of the Protected Class

Viewing the enhanced particular vulnerabilities associated with
disability as situational also impairs membership in the protected class,
exacerbating the limitations addressed in Section One of this Part. Class
membership may be limited when an individual’s functioning is assessed
within a small environment. Some individuals with significant
impairments may not be considered disabled because they are able to
function in particular circumstances or environments. For example, an
individual who manages her rheumatoid arthritis partially with drugs and
mostly with willpower, and is able to perform manual tasks working as
an airline stewardess, might not be considered disabled for purposes of
workplace assessment.174 This individual may be disabled, despite such
measures, outside the workplace if her arthritis prevents her from
performing vital household and personal tasks.
On the other hand, class membership may be constrained when the
environment assessed is expanded beyond the situation where an
individual most acutely experiences impairment to functioning.
Typically, the broader the context for assessing impairments of a major
life activity, the less likely an individual is to be considered part of the
protected class because she will be able to function in some portion of
the environment. The disability threshold test requires that impairments
to functioning are “substantial” for a particular environment.175 The
breadth of the environment is determined by the major life activity
affected. In some cases, the environment is extremely narrow: one’s own
body. This is the case for the major life activities of walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and reproducing, for example.176
Class membership is usually recognized with respect to significant
impairment of these major life activities. In other cases, however, the
relevant environment is broadly construed, and class membership is
often denied.
174. Prior to the AAA, an individual was not considered disabled when she adapted by using
drugs, devices, or other mitigating measures. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
480 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1999).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
176. See 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(i) (2008) (“Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639–41 (1998) (recognizing reproduction as
a major life activity).
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The U.S. Supreme Court looked to the “tasks that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives”177 to assess the major life
activity of “performing manual tasks.” Applying this standard to a
wrongful employment termination claim, the Court held that the relevant
environment for assessing manual tasks is one’s home as well as one’s
workplace: an employee who functions at home performing most
manual tasks but is unable to complete the manual tasks associated with
her job is not disabled.178 If the Court limited the relevant environment
for performing manual tasks to the workplace (which arguably better
aligns with the plaintiff’s legal claim), the employee would be
disabled.179 While the AAA abandons the test that an individual must be
“prevent[ed] or severely restrict[ed]” in tasks “of central importance to
most people’s daily lives,” it is significant that the AAA would not
change the outcome in this case if the relevant environment for assessing
manual tasks continued to include both the home and the workplace.180
Similarly, the Court indicates in dicta that if working is a major life
activity (it is recognized as such under the AAA),181 an individual must
be impaired in a “broad class of jobs” to be considered disabled.182 In
other words, a particular job cannot be the relevant environment for
assessing impairment of the major life activity of working. The EEOC
regulations do not determine with specificity the breadth of the
environment, but they consider both “[t]he geographical area in which
the individual has reasonable access” as well as jobs “within [the
immediate] geographical area . . . from which the individual is also
disqualified.”183
Strikingly, the Court’s assessment of the major life activities of

177. Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
178. Id. at 200–02.
179. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc, 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534
U.S. 184 (2002).
180. It is possible, however, that the plaintiff might be limited in a different major life activity,
even within a broad environment for assessment. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). (“An impairment that substantially limits one major
life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”).
181. Id. § 3.
182. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999));
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001) (“With respect to the major life activity of working[,] [t]he
term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities.”).
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)–(C).
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performing manual tasks and working acknowledges that the human
experience is not a fragmented one. The ability to perform manual tasks
is recognized as relevant in both the public and private realms. The
capability of working is understood to extend outside the immediate
workplace environment and into the broader public realm.
Unfortunately, the Court uses this perspective to determine that
functioning in a particular environment requires the denial of disability
protections, rather than to inform jurisprudence about constant
vulnerabilities that may manifest at certain times.
The Court’s treatment of the major life activities of performing
manual tasks and working identifies a notable inconsistency in the
judicial recognition of the relevant environmental boundaries for
assessing an individual’s functioning for purposes of the ADA. The
Court expands the environment-frame to deny protected class
membership (for example, assessing the ability to perform manual tasks
at home and at work) and contracts the environment-frame to limit
entitlement to a remedy (for example, assessing the need for
accommodation only within the workplace).184 As discussed earlier in
this Part, the narrower the environment is for accommodation, the less
likely an individual is to receive an accommodation that addresses her
impairments because they probably extend beyond the environment
assessed. Thus, treating impairments as situational in these contexts
undermines disability protections in two ways: assessing a large
environment may deny protected class membership, and using a small
environment to determine entitlement to accommodation may not
address impairments to functioning and fragment protections. If the
expanded protected class under the AAA focuses the Court on
remedy,185 the narrow environment-frame for accommodation may result
in the denial of protections for disabled individuals. This is significant
because it might shift the gatekeeping function from class membership
to entitlement to remedy and continue to restrict disability protections.
Viewing impairments as situational also disregards the benefits for
disabled and nondisabled individuals alike of responding to vulnerability
as a universal aspect of the human condition. All workers benefit from
flexible work schedules or architectural design integrating ramps (for
184. This phenomenon is similar to the “time-framing” construct in criminal law described by
Mark Kelman where laws implicitly embrace arbitrary time-frames to avoid certain political
problems. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 600–42 (1981).
185. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
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wheelchairs, strollers, or luggage on wheels), wider elevators and
bathrooms, and lever door handles (easier to open when hands are
occupied). A better approach would consider a diverse range of methods
of functioning and design social programs and buildings accordingly.
Such an approach is supported by Fineman’s vulnerability thesis.
Section III applies the insights of Fineman’s vulnerability thesis to
argue for a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach to disability law
reform. The concept of disability as universal and constant vulnerability
is discussed with regard to the four “second generation” disability
discrimination problems identified in the introduction—remaining
barriers to entry into the workforce, lack of material supports such as
health care, constraints on accommodating atypical modes of
functioning, and limitations on protected class membership due to what
now may be understood as fragmenting disability protections.
Susceptibility to disability discrimination must not be viewed as merely
situational, requiring only material supports within limited public
environments. Further, some shared vulnerabilities of disabled and
nondisabled individuals, including those related to medical care, are best
addressed through programs that do not require protected class
membership.
III. BLENDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Disabled individuals continue to experience barriers to class
membership, work, desired accommodation, and material support. The
problems of protected class membership are only partially resolved by
the AAA. Under the Act, individuals will be assessed in a pre-mitigated
state and qualify for disability protections with impairments that do not
“significantly restrict” a major life activity.186 Enlarging the protected
class, however, places pressure on the reasonable accommodation
mandate, which is currently unfunded. Further, some individuals with
impairments will continue to be excluded from the class due to the
nature of their impairments or the problems of fragmentation, raising the
question of when the state should provide social welfare programs to
address vulnerability.
Fineman’s vulnerability thesis supports a move toward broad social
welfare programs in areas such as employment, health care, and
education. This would entail a departure from the civil rights approach to

186. AAA § 2(a)(8).
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disability and other vulnerabilities and the restructuring of legal and
social institutions to respond to universal vulnerability. In the
employment context, institutions would address the shared
vulnerabilities of disabled and other workers associated with barriers to
entry and accessing accommodations that facilitate employment. As
William Johnson argues, workers disabled as adults face similar barriers
to reentry into the workforce as those unemployed by workforce cutbacks or factory closings: “low skills, intermittent or marginal
employment, [and] the relative ease with which an employer can find
replacement workers . . . .”187 Workers who are not disabled are worse
off in the sense that they are ineligible for Social Security Disability
Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, and corresponding health care
benefits.188
The approach I advocate is a compromise. I employ the insights of
Fineman’s theory to understand the problems with the way in which the
ADA responds to disability. Vulnerability theory reveals that the goals
of the ADA of increasing employment and reducing isolation are not
fulfilled by equal protection or sameness treatment. Rather, they require
accommodation that responds to universal and constant vulnerability that
may give rise to discrimination. I do not argue, as Fineman does, that the
liberal subject must be replaced by the vulnerable subject. My view is
that legal structures do not have to be shaped exclusively around one or
the other but rather that it is possible for them to respond to a “liberal
subject who has universal vulnerabilities.” In other words, our
conception of the autonomous individual under traditional democratic
theory is impoverished.189 Vulnerability theory demonstrates that
disability and the vulnerabilities associated with it are part of the human
condition and helps to inform our picture of the individual at the center
of democratic theory. In practical terms, this means that I advocate law
reform that appeals to both the civil rights and social welfare paradigms
to address the significant impediments to the social participation of
disabled persons.
In Subpart A, I advocate a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach
to employment. While class membership will be restricted in accordance

187. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168–69.
188. Id. Displaced workers who are not disabled receive unemployment and health benefits for a
limited period after their termination, the latter at a higher premium then when they were employed.
Id.
189. I thank Emory Law Professor Tim Terrell for this point.

551

SATZ-FINAL-FINAL.DOC

Washington Law Review

1/7/2009 12:48 PM

Vol. 83:513, 2008

with an antidiscrimination approach, accommodations will be more
broadly available and subsidized by the state as a matter of social
welfare. This Subpart discusses the role of reasonable accommodation in
addressing barriers to employment, including lack of material supports
such as transportation, and in supporting atypical modes of functioning. I
argue that the reasonable accommodation mandate must be given a
broader social purpose—one that extends beyond what formal equality
requires but continues to rely on membership in the protected class.
Vulnerability will be addressed as constant and universal for disabled
individuals rather than as situational.
In Subpart B, I argue that the state should adopt a social welfare
approach to health care to address universal vulnerability. Illness is
perhaps the prime example of a universal and constant vulnerability.
When manifest, it significantly heightens other vulnerabilities for
disabled and nondisabled people alike; it is not a disability issue. Access
to health care must be addressed outside the civil rights context.
The difference in my approach to employment and health care stems
largely from practical considerations. In the employment context, I do
not believe that a radical departure from the formal equality approach to
disability discrimination to a system addressing the universal
vulnerability of workers is politically feasible. Historical resistance to
expanding most social welfare programs,190 declining benefits of
existing programs,191 and sustained periods of low unemployment during
solid financial times192 provide support for this view. In addition, the
history of oppression of individuals with disabilities and the staggering
numbers of disabled persons who are denied entry into the workplace
bolster an approach that focuses on disability as a protected class. The
190. See generally Margaret R. Somers & Fred Block, From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas,
Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 260 (2005)
(discussing how social welfare regimes fail in light of market-based approaches to wealth
distribution due to “the perversity thesis,” or the view that social welfare contributes to the plight of
the poor).
191. See, e.g., Robert Moffitt, David Ribar & Mark Wilhelm, The Decline of Welfare Benefits in
the U.S.: The Role of Wage Inequality, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 421, 423–24 (1998).
192. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Fighting
Poverty: Lessons from Recent U.S. History, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2000, at 7 (discussing
consistently low unemployment rates during economic prosperity in the 1990s); see also U.S. Dep’t
of
Labor,
Labor
Force
Statistics
from
the
Current
Population
Survey,
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS140
00000 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (indicating low unemployment rates during times of economic
prosperity
from
1998–2002
and
2006–2008),
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n192.pdf.
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ADA may in fact be understood as a law that seeks to draw a particularly
isolated protected class into the greater polity, whereas other civil rights
mandates speak to various protected classes.
Universal health care is a political and practical possibility, however.
Forty-six million Americans are uninsured,193 and studies indicate that
twenty-five million adults are underinsured, as measured by medical
expenses relative to income.194 Large-scale government health care
programs already operate,195 and public spending on health care is at
sixty percent.196 Unsurprisingly, the last three presidential elections
witnessed universal health care as a platform.197
193. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 19
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf, permanent copy available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n193.pdf.
194. Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and
2007,
HEALTH
AFF.,
Jun.
10,
2008,
at
w300,
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.4.w298v1?ijkey=rhRn2Tr4HAKZ.&keytype=r
ef&siteid=healthaff,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n194.pdf.
195. Government programs include Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP), the military entitlement programs (TRICARE and the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Department of Veteran Affairs (CHAMPVA)), and the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program. Medicaid and SCHIP operate at the state level with federal oversight, and
the other programs are federal. Medicare provides “basic protection against the costs of hospital,
related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care” for all individuals age 65 or over,
certain disabled individuals who are government or railroad employees, and individuals suffering
from end-stage renal disease. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000). Medicaid provides “medical assistance on
behalf of families with dependent children and of the aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.” Id. § 1396.
Medicaid is typically provided to individuals at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty line,
which is currently $20,650 for a family of four. See, e.g., Kaiser Family Found., Income Eligibility
for Parents Applying for Medicaid by Annual Income as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL),
2008, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=205&cat=4 (last visited Dec. 22,
2008), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev
513n195.pdf; see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 3147 (Jan. 24,
2007). SCHIP provides basic medical coverage to children ineligible for Medicaid; its target
population is children in families at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty line. State
Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–jj (2000); 42 C.F.R. 457.310(b)(1)(i)
(2007) (describing “targe[t] low-income child”).
196. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 91, 94 (2002) (“Public funding” includes all tax-financed health
care, such as health care and research programs, hospital subsidies, individual and employer tax
subsidies, and government employee health care plans.).
197. See, e.g., Robin Toner, 2008 Candidates Vow to Overhaul U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/us/politics/06health.html,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197a.pdf;
Robin Toner, The 2004 Campaign: The Issue: Democrats See a New Urgency in Health Care, N.Y.
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I do not mean to suggest that law reform efforts should abandon the
push for greater equity in employment irrespective of identity categories.
Women, racial minorities, unskilled laborers, disabled workers whose
impairments limit their productivity,198 and individuals whose
impairments do not rise to legally cognizable disabilities also face
barriers to employment due to fragmented protections of their
vulnerabilities. Ideally, the state would respond to all such
vulnerabilities.
A.

Rethinking Reasonable Accommodation

This Section argues that the reasonable accommodation mandate must
account for the universal vulnerabilities of disabled individuals in social
and civic life. This requires that the mandate have a broader social or
redistributive purpose than that embodied in the ADA. Broadening the
scope of reasonable accommodation entails a mixed civil rights/social
welfare approach to accommodation. Eligibility for accommodation
remains tied to membership in the protected class, though vulnerabilities
of disabled individuals are viewed as extending across contexts. As a
result, disabled persons are entitled to greater material resources as
enabled by government support. While expanding the reasonable
accommodation mandate does not reflect the intent of the drafters of the
ADA,199 it supports stated congressional goals of decreasing barriers of
entry for disabled workers and lessening isolation more generally.200
Such an expansion substantially addresses employment barriers for
disabled individuals occurring outside the workplace, including lack of
reliable transportation and accommodations that benefit an employee at
work as well as at home. The focus of this Section is employment, but I
briefly discuss how my concept of reasonable accommodation might

TIMES,
Jan.
14,
2004,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/14/politics/campaigns/14HEAL.html, permanent copy available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197b.pdf; James Dao, The 2000
Campaign: The Challenger; Bradley Nod to Clinton on Universal Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23,
2000,
at
A18,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404EEDB1330F930A15751C0A9669C8B63,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197c.pdf.
198. These workers are not “qualified individuals with a disability” for purposes of the ADA if
they are unable to fulfill the essential functions of their job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000), amended
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
199. See, e.g., Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40.
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), (5), (9), (b).
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facilitate greater accommodation of multiple ways of functioning for
people utilizing public services or places of public accommodation.
1.

Addressing Barriers to Employment

Individuals with disabilities continue to face substantial barriers to
receiving and maintaining employment. Prior to the passage of the ADA,
the Congressional Record indicates that “[t]wo-thirds of all disabled
Americans between the age of 16 and 64 are met [sic] working . . . .
Sixty-six percent of working-age disabled persons . . . say that they
would like to have a job . . . . [T]his means that about 8.2 million people
with disabilities want to work but cannot find a job.”201 As of today,
statistics indicate the same or lower rates of employment.202 Evidence
also suggests that the greatest problems for workers disabled as adults
(the majority of disabled individuals) are obstacles to reemployment
following disabling incidents, rather than structural issues such as wage
discrimination.203
Commentators suggest that the potential barriers to employment (and
arguably to reentry into the workplace) for disabled individuals include
employer concern that accommodations will be costly, employee
difficulty maintaining necessary work schedules due to lack of
transportation or accommodations at home, and the absence of legally
mandated accommodations for workers whose impairments limit their
productivity.204 The first two difficulties—employer fear of
accommodation costs and employee need for material supports related to
working—pertain to accommodating productive workers as mandated by
the ADA.205 Employing individuals with impairments that limit their
productivity, in particular those born with severe disabilities, would
entail social commitment to a stronger view of equity and the value of
employment for all persons.206 I do not address this latter issue, though it
201. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314
(citing STEWART LEICHENKO, ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED
AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 47–50 (1986)).
202. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
203. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168–69.
204. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text discussing accommodation; see also
Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 26 (discussing lack of material supports); Johnson, supra note 38, at
164 (discussing how the ADA does not adequately address workers with limited productivity).
205. See supra note 166 and accompanying text discussing a “qualified individual with a
disability.”
206. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168.
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warrants serious discussion elsewhere.
Current accommodations under the ADA are limited even for
productive workers. In theory, disabled persons are entitled to the same
benefits that individuals without disabilities receive, namely, jobs as
well as access to services and places of public accommodation. The
scope of the remedy is dictated by a statutorily recognized environment
or situation. Disabled workers may be provided with “job related”
accommodations to function in the workplace.207 A reasonable
accommodation is not required if employers establish that it poses an
“undue hardship”208 or a “direct threat” to the health or safety of
others.209 Access to services and places of public accommodation most
often amounts to physical access rather than meaningful enjoyment of
services or public space. Public areas outside the workplace must be
accessible unless alterations to existing structures are not “readily
achievable”;210 public services need not be altered if they require an
undue burden or a “fundamental alteration” of the “nature of the service,
program, or activity.”211
As it stands, the reasonable accommodation provision is redistributive
in a pure sense: with the exception of scarce government subsidies,
resources are taken from employers and other firms to make
accommodations. The framers of the ADA did not intend for the Act to
be more broadly redistributive, that is, to require a shift of wealth or
material resources from firms to disabled persons beyond that required
by the antidiscrimination mandate.212 Even within this narrow context,
commentators question whether the role of the reasonable
accommodation provision under Title I is to shift costs of workplace
accommodations to employers or to require that the employer and
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
208. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (holding that a
direct threat is one that poses a “significant risk” to others, as indicated by “medical or other
objective evidence”).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The statute defines “readily achievable” as “easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense . . . . [F]actors to be
considered include—the nature and cost of the action . . . the overall financial resource of the
facility . . . the overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . and the [nature] of the
operation . . . .” Id. § 12181(9). New construction must comply with the ADA. Id. §§ 12146,
12183(a).
211. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7), 35.150(a)(3) (2008).
212. See Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40.
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employee both contribute to accommodation (cost-sharing).213
Under the mixed civil rights/social welfare approach I advocate,
protected class members would receive accommodations that exceed the
scope of the current antidiscrimination mandate (and formal equality).
The reasonable accommodation mandate would be expanded with more
robust government supports for disabled workers.214 Employees who are
susceptible to impairment would receive accommodations throughout
their daily environments. For example, disabled workers may receive
accommodations for transportation to work or tools that facilitate their
functioning at home as well as at the workplace.
This expansion of the reasonable accommodation mandate requires
law reform on two fronts. First, it is necessary to create funding
structures to relieve employers from the financial burden of fulfilling all
reasonable accommodations. The legislature could determine a ceiling
for the percentage of annual earnings an employer is required to spend
on accommodations for disabled employees. Affected employers as
currently defined by the ADA215 would not be required to fund
accommodations outside this amount. Government subsidies would
begin where employer subsidization ends.216 This approach would allow
employer responsibility for accommodations to be capped, while
expanding disability protections beyond discrete environments.
213. Id. at 636–70; see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing
the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1180–86 (2002).
214. I want to emphasize that I am making a normative argument for the expansion of the
reasonable accommodation mandate. I am not making a cost-benefit argument or considering the
constraints of current budgets.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks . . . .”). The definition of “employer” does not include the United States, Indian
tribes, or private firms exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c). Id.§ 12111(5)(B).
216. Current subsidies are limited. The Work Opportunity Credit provides a tax credit of up to
forty percent of the first $6000 ($2400) of an employee’s qualified first-year wages. I.R.C. § 51(a)
(2008); see also IRS Form 5884, Work Opportunity Credit (OMB No. 1545-0219) (2007), available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f5884.pdf,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n216a.pdf. Employers of veterans with a
service-related disability are eligible for up to twice that amount. I.R.C. § 51(d)(1)(b), 51(d)(3). The
Disabled Access Credit provides a credit for up to $10,000 per year for disability accommodations
made by businesses earning $1 million or less or with fewer than 31 full-time employees. Id. § 44;
see also IRS Form 8826, Disabled Access Credit (OMB No. 1545-1205) (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8826.pdf,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n216b.pdf. The Architectural Barrier
Removal Tax Deduction provides a deduction of up to $15,000 per year for expenses that remove
architectural or transportation barriers for disabled or elderly individuals. I.R.C. § 190 (2008). The
Disability Access Credit and the Barrier Removal Tax Deduction may be obtained in the same year.
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Second, the interactive process recommended by the EEOC, a process
by which employers engage employees in a dialogue about the
accommodation that would best facilitate their functioning, must be
federally mandated and refined. During this process, employees would
identify accommodations they need to function in the workplace as well
as those that may assist them indirectly with their employment by
enabling their functioning at home. The law would require that adaptive
tools benefitting an individual in her workplace as well as at home and
in other environments be given preference. In addition, preference would
be given to accommodations that support employees’ desired modes of
functioning, whether they are typical (for example, walking with braces)
or atypical (wheeling). The undue hardship test would remain as a
defense for failing to make an accommodation, though the burden would
be measured taking into account government subsidies for which the
employer is eligible, even if the employer fails to apply for them.
To the extent this approach forces a reexamination of the norms of the
workplace, I believe it may go some distance in addressing structural
inequalities for disabled workers. The mandated interactive process,
coupled with the provision of reasonable accommodation to facilitate
functioning across various environments, would focus more attention on
the systemic treatment of disabled workers. Federal funds for
accommodations could be made contingent on the hiring and retention
practices (including pay equity) of employers with respect to disabled
employees. I believe this approach holds more promise for addressing
bias against disabled workers than asking employers to make local
changes. Seeking change from within individual workplaces asks
employers, who are in a position of advantage, to reexamine their
practices.217 Imposing uniform incentives for change may provide a
much greater impetus for altering stigmatizing or exclusionary
procedures and policies.
2.

Supporting Atypical Modes of Functioning

In addition to addressing barriers to employment, the mixed civil
rights/social welfare approach to reasonable accommodation would
provide greater support for atypical ways of functioning for employees.
217. Bagenstos discusses a “structural” approach to antidiscrimination law, which would rely on
the law to identify norms that reduce workplace bias (including unconscious bias) and empower
employees, but does not believe it will be successful due to difficulties with implementation.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4.
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This approach recognizes that the vulnerabilities associated with
disability, while part of the human condition, are uniquely experienced
by each individual.218 The ultimate choice of a reasonable
accommodation would remain with the employer, but the mandated
interactive process would give preference to employees’ preferred
modes of functioning. A disabled employee may favor typing with her
feet instead of her upper arm prosthetics, working in a dark office space
rather than wearing shaded glasses to address light sensitivity, or
working from the floor rather than a cushioned chair to avoid back pain.
The employer’s comfort with atypical modes of functioning is not
relevant, so long as the employee is able to fulfill the essential functions
of her job.219
As I discuss in previous work, the role of typical or normal
functioning (the importance of functioning as most people do) is not
directly addressed by the courts, and current judicial treatment of
functioning is inconsistent and misguided.220 Most Supreme Court case
law under Title I indicates that when the Court considers the relevance
of normal functioning in relation to workplace accommodations, it does
so under the disability threshold test in a manner that excludes
individuals with impairments from the protected class.221 If an individual
is able to function atypically, she is denied disability protections.222
When it comes to the issue of accommodation, however, the Court does
not give preference to an employee’s preferred mode of functioning, be
it typical or atypical.223 Thus, the Court has it exactly backwards:
effective atypical functioning is considered a barrier to disability class
membership but is not treated as a relevant factor for accommodation.224
The AAA broadens protected class membership, though individuals who
function atypically with mitigating measures that are not legally
recognized may still be excluded.225 My approach requires that
218. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
220. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 243–48.
221. Id. at 245–46.
222. Id. The AAA lessens the impact of this to some extent by assessing an individual for
disability in a pre-mitigated state. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122
Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008).
223. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 246–48.
224. Id. at 248–65.
225. See supra note 163 and accompanying text discussing willpower and fortitude as a
mitigating measure.
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individuals are assessed prior to all mitigating measures.
Supporting atypical functioning under Title II (public services) and
Title III (public accommodations) is more complex than under Title I. It
requires facilitating meaningful access to key areas of social and civic
participation; access into various physical spaces is insufficient. For
example, an individual should be able to enter a movie theater as well as
experience a film, board a commuter train and signal for a stop, and
access a public library as well as appreciate its collection. Given the
number of people partaking in these experiences and the variety of ways
in which people function, reasonable accommodation in these contexts
will require a more radical departure from current practices than in the
employment context. Funds must be allotted to improve the provision of
transportation and other services. While government subsidies may
enable private firms to make greater structural changes, most efficient
change will likely not occur through renovation but with new
construction that aims to support more ways of functioning.
Universal design, “the design of products and environments to be
usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for
adaptation or specialized design,”226 may ultimately be the most
economical way to address the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals
arising from physical spaces. Universal design relies on seven principles:
“equitable use,” “flexibility in use,” “simple and intuitive” use,
“perceptible information,” “tolerance for error,” “low physical effort,”
and “size and space” appropriate for use.227 These principles could also
guide the initial planning of the infrastructure for a facility’s service
operations. By accommodating a greater number of ways of functioning
at the construction stage, fewer buildings would need to be retrofitted as
access issues arise. Universal design responds to impairments that may
not be considered disabilities under law, however, and supports
impairments to functioning and universal vulnerability more

226.
The
Ctr.
for
Universal
Design,
N.C.
State
Univ.,
About
UD,
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/about_ud.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2008), permanent
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n226.pdf; see also
ROBERT F. ERLANDSON, UNIVERSAL AND ACCESSIBLE DESIGN FOR PRODUCTS, SERVICES, AND
PROCESSES 17 (2008).
227. The Ctr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ., UD Principles,
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/udprincipleshtmlformat.html#top (last visited Dec. 24,
2008),
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n227.pdf; see also ERLANDSON, supra
note 226, at 67 (“ergonomically sound, perceptible, cognitively sound, flexible, error-managed
(proofed), efficient, stable and predictable, equitable”).
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generally.228 As a result, it extends beyond what my framework (or the
ADA) requires for reasonable accommodation, and individuals would
implement universal design principles on a voluntary basis.
One area where a universal approach to vulnerability may be
politically and practically feasible is health care. I argue in the next
Subpart that the issues facing disabled individuals with regard to health
care access are likely best addressed by moving away from the civil
rights paradigm altogether.
B.

Disability and Health Care Justice

This Subpart argues that access to health care is a universal
vulnerability rather than a disability issue and that vulnerability analysis
provides a strong argument for a social welfare (universal) approach to
health care. To be clear, I do not intend in this brief discussion to
provide a comprehensive normative argument for universal health care; I
have done so in other work.229 My goal is to provide arguments for why
illness is not a disability issue but a matter of universal and constant
vulnerability. I suggest that this concept of vulnerability lends support to
a move away from government insurance programs that target particular
groups of individuals to a more comprehensive state response to medical
needs. Viewing illness as universal and constant vulnerability
contributes a new perspective on the need for universal health care.
Restructuring current health care institutions to support health care as a
public good may be the best way to address vulnerability to illness and
the vulnerabilities that result from illness.
First and foremost, disability does not equate with illness. The
population of individuals who are ill or medically fragile exceeds the
disability class. Illness may give rise to disability, but it does not
presuppose it.230 All individuals are vulnerable to illness. When such
vulnerabilities are realized, they result in dependencies for care and
impairments that may or may not be disabling. Thus, disabled and
nondisabled individuals alike are vulnerable to illness and share
228. See ERLANDSON , supra note 226, at 6.
229. See Ani B. Satz, Toward Solving the Health Care Crisis: The Paradoxical Case for
Universal Access to High Technology, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93 (2008); Ani B.
Satz, The Limits of Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1451 (2008).
230. See, e.g., WENDELL, supra note 90, at 20 (arguing that chronic illness may be disabling);
SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 79 (arguing that illness normally does not
constitute a disability though “disability often is a sequela of illness and . . . illness, especially
chronic illness, can itself be disabling.”).
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vulnerabilities from illness. Without health, disabled and nondisabled
individuals cannot work or socially integrate. Indeed, philosophers argue
that for this reason health care is a vital social good.231
Second, current legal structures that impede access to health care for
disabled individuals also disadvantage individuals who are not disabled.
Access to care may be understood both as the ability to obtain health
insurance as well as the ability to have necessary services under a health
plan (the content of health insurance). Health insurance is provided
through public and private mechanisms. Public insurance is offered
through government entitlement and government employee benefit
programs, and private insurers offer group or individual health care
plans.232 Most health insurance in the United States is provided through
private employee benefit plans.233 Government programs target only
particular segments of the population, including disabled individuals
who are eligible for Social Security benefits.234 Employers are not
required to offer health insurance plans or any particular level of
benefits, so long as employees are treated in the same manner.235 Lack of
health insurance is therefore a problem for both disabled and
nondisabled individuals. In fact, disabled persons who receive Social
Security benefits may receive more support through federal programs
231. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING
RAWLS 181–96 (1989); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 50 (1999).
232. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. Private payors include indemnity insurers,
employers (self-insured or insured through private companies), and a variety of managed care
arrangements.
233. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS 1, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/Summary-of-Findings-EHBS2007.pdf (158 million Americans receive health insurance through their employer), permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n233a.pdf. Employers pay
74.4 percent of health care expenses for their employees. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SPONSORS OF HEALTH CARE COSTS,
BUSINESSES, HOUSEHOLDS, AND GOVERNMENTS, 1987-2006 Table 4, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/bhg08.pdf,
permanent
copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n233b.pdf.
234. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
235. As one commentator notes:
Under civil rights principles it is sufficient that people with disabilities have equal access to
insurance offices and, once inside those offices, have equal right to purchase insurance policies
having the same contents as policies purchased by nondisabled persons. Changing the terms or
contents of the insurance policies so that people with disabilities receive coverage equal to that
provided to nondisabled people, however, requires affirmative action that goes beyond basic
civil rights premises.
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 382 (2001).
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than those without disability.
Similarly, disabled and nondisabled individuals with health insurance
may not receive coverage for the services they need. So long as plans
provide contracted-for benefits, they are allowed to employ costcontainment mechanisms that may result in the denial of certain
services.236 The ADA provides that such distinctions may not be
disability-based, however. Under Title V, the plan must be “bona fide”
and “underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks”
may not be “used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapters I
and III.”237 A bona fide plan is understood as one with clear contractual
terms that pays benefits.238 Title I pertains to employers, and Title III to
places of public accommodation, including insurance offices.239 While
the plain language of Title III requires that individuals have physical
access to insurance offices, a few courts have applied the title to the
health care services covered by an insurance policy.240
The EEOC Guidance on Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer
Provided Health Insurance241 defines a disability-based distinction as
one that “singles out a particular disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS,
schizophrenia), a discrete group of disabilities (e.g., cancers, muscular
dystrophies, kidney diseases), or disability in general (e.g., non-coverage
of all conditions that substantially limit a major life activity).”242
Examples of illegal disability-based distinctions by employers include
236. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220–22 (2000).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
238. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Interim Enforcement Guidance on the
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in
Employer Provided Health Insurance, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 8, 1993), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html [hereinafter EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance],
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n238.pdf.
The EEOC regulations do not define “bona fide” plan for purposes of the ADA, though it is defined
in the regulations implementing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. §
1625.10(a)(2)(b) (2008) (“A plan is considered ‘bona fide’ if its terms (including cessation of
contributions or accruals in the case of retirement income plans) have been accurately described in
writing to all employees and if it actually provides the benefits in accordance with the terms of the
plan.”).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
240. See, e.g., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559–60 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto.
Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1994); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins.
Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995).
241. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
242. EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance, supra note 238, § (7)(III)(B).
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refusing to insure individuals based on HIV status, capping
reimbursement for the treatment of neurological conditions, or lowering
health care upon retirement based on disability status.243 An insurance
policy may distinguish broadly between a “multitude of dissimilar
conditions” and limit access to disabled individuals, so long as it
imposes the same restriction on individuals without disability.244
Limitations on certain medical procedures, waiting periods for
preexisting conditions, and caps on coverage are examples of allowed
constraints that may affect the ability of disabled and nondisabled
individuals alike to access care.245 Further, a plan is not a subterfuge if
its disability distinctions are based on actuarially sound principles that
treat disabled and nondisabled individuals the same, are necessary to
preserve the plan’s solvency, or are required to avoid undermining or
significantly altering the plan for other employees.246
Until recently, complete parity between mental and physical health
care benefits was not required, under the views that mental health care
services are provided to individuals who have statutorily recognized
disabilities as well as to those who do not, and mental health care covers
a range of dissimilar conditions.247 The recent Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008248 mandates complete parity between
physical and mental health benefits for insurers who offer plans that
cover mental health care services. Caps on annual or lifetime spending,
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 7(III)(C)(2).
247. The EEOC argues that long-term disability plans that distinguish between mental and
physical conditions are disability-based, and courts are split on the issue. Compare Fletcher v. Tufts
Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111, 114 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2005) (finding that termination of disability
payments based on mental disability but not physical disability violates Title I), with EEOC v. Bath
Iron Works Corp., No. 97-355-P-H, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600, at *17–22 (D. Me. Feb. 8, 1999)
(finding that defendant company’s two-year limit on benefits for mental or nervous disorders but
not physical ones does not violate Title I).
248. Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 511
(2008). Previously, complete parity was not required. See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996,
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(1)-(2) (2000); EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance, supra note 238
(“Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions
than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions . . . . Such broad distinctions, which apply
to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar conditions and which constrain individuals both with
and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability . . . . and do not violate the ADA.”);
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–18 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no
violation of Titles I and III for disparity between mental and physical disability benefits under
employee disability insurance policy); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d
Cir. 1998) (same).
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coinsurance, deductibles, and the number of covered visits must be the
same for physical and mental health benefits.249 Insurers, including
employers, need not offer any mental health benefits, however.
Thus, individuals who are disabled face the same barriers as other
patients to access to health care in terms of being able to obtain health
insurance and having coverage for the particular services they need.
Complicating factors include the high rates of unemployment for
disabled individuals who do not qualify for Social Security benefits
based on permanent disability, a possible higher consumption of health
care resources, health care rationing schemes that disfavor those with
medical impairments, and difficulty moving between assistance
programs that include health care and the workforce. Arguably,
individuals who are not disabled are also vulnerable in similar terms,
however. Unskilled workers and at-will employees are vulnerable to
unemployment; unskilled workers have a smaller range of employment
opportunities than skilled workers, and at-will employees are vulnerable
to discharge. Individuals who are not disabled may also require a
significant amount of health care services. In fact, elderly persons and
premature infants are the greatest consumers of health care resources,
with high costs for care during the last or the first few months of life.250
Further, elderly as well as disabled individuals may be
disproportionately impacted by the metrics used to ration care and to
segregate risk. In Oregon, for example, care for the indigent through
Medicaid is rationed based on predicted health outcomes and cost.251

249. H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512.
250. In 2004, health care expenditures for people 65 years and older were $531.46 billion, which
is 5.6 times the amount spent on children and 3.3 times the cost of care for adults. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE
E XPENDITURES BY A GE , available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/
downloads/2004-age-tables.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/83washlrev513n250a.pdf. Of course, some of these individuals may be disabled. In 2005,
the estimated “social cost” (“medical, education, and lost productivity”) of preterm births was $26.2
billion. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Features–Premature Births,
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/PrematureBirth/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008), permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ wlr/notes/83washlrev513n250b.pdf.
251. Health care services are scaled in order of priority. Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform
Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health Plan, HEALTH AFF., Dec. 19, 2006, at w96,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/1/w96, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n251a.pdf. During 2008–2009, the
Oregon Medicaid plan will provide 503 of the 680 basic health services the state aspires to cover.
Or. Health Servs. Comm’n, Current Prioritized List, available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR
/HSC/current_prior.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
83washlrev513n251b.pdf.
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Disabled, elderly, and medically fragile individuals may face double
jeopardy if they are medically needy but not entitled to health care
resources based on their perceived health status or length of life. Under
private insurance schemes, those with existing illnesses may be viewed
as high-risk insureds. While the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act252 provides some protections for continued insurance
for individuals previously covered under group health insurance plans,
high-risk individuals who retain insurance may be forced to pay high
premiums.253
Temporarily unemployed disabled and other individuals may
experience difficulty moving between social welfare programs for the
unemployed that include health care and the workforce. William
Johnson notes that health insurance is vital for disabled individuals to
forego Social Security disability benefits,254 and wages must be
significantly higher for all individuals to fund health care for a chronic
condition.255 While the Ticket to Work Incentives Improvement Act
(1999) remedies this issue to some extent for disabled individuals, it
leaves eligible workers uninsured after eight and a half years.256
In sum, vulnerability to illness as well as the vulnerabilities and
dependencies created by illness with respect to access to care are not
disability issues. Illness is in fact the paradigmatic example of universal
vulnerability. The universal vulnerability thesis explicated in this Article
lends support (and perhaps a new voice) to a move toward universal
health care.
On a practical level, responding to vulnerability to illness through a
patchwork of programs that target certain groups—disabled, indigent,
elderly, and minor-age persons—has historically failed to insure the
252. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
253. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-100, PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING 1996 FEDERAL STANDARDS 12–14
(1999) (premiums for individual plans for nonsmoker with juvenile-onset diabetes range from 100–
464 percent of the standard premium), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99100.pdf,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n253.pdf.
254. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 171.
255. See id.; see also supra note 194 and accompanying text discussing underinsurance.
256. The Act extends Medicare Part A (hospital) premium-free coverage for disability
beneficiaries who return to work. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 202, 113 Stat. 1860, 1894 (1999). In addition, the Act allows states to extend
Medicaid payments, possibly for cash payments, including providing Medicaid to workers who are
not actually disabled but who have physical or mental impairments that are “reasonably expected”
to become severe disabilities in the absence of health care. Id. §§ 201, 204.
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medically needy or to provide sufficient care to those who are covered.
Further, it resulted in extraordinary government expenditures. Recall that
government spending is at sixty percent, and in 2005, health care costs
reached $1.9 trillion.257 Other countries provide a universal level of
coverage for their citizens at a similar or lower cost.258 For many
decades the United States has witnessed advocates, scholars, and
politicians arguing for universal health care from a variety of moral and
economic perspectives, but it may be that the recognition of illness as
universal vulnerability is what will drive future reform efforts.
CONCLUSION
Since the passage of the ADA in 1990, disabled individuals have
continued to face great barriers to entry into the workplace, job
retention, protected class membership, access to health care,
transportation, and accommodations that support their preferred methods
of functioning. Emerging scholarship suggests that remedies for these
problems lie in the development of social welfare structures to provide
material supports as well as requirements that employers more
substantially address barriers to the employment of disabled persons. I
advocate a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach that requires a
more responsive and vigilant state and lessens the burden on employers.
My approach is informed by the view that vulnerability to disability
as well as the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals are universal and
constant. Current antidiscrimination law fragments disability protections
by treating vulnerability as if it arises in discrete situations rather than as
an aspect of the human condition. To address the universal and constant
vulnerabilities associated with disability, the reasonable accommodation
provision must be given a broader social purpose and the interactive

257. John A. Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes Obscure
Part D’s Impact, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 21, 2007, at w242–43, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/262/2/w242.pdf,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n257.pdf.
258. See, e.g., CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. HEALTH
CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 58 (2007), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf (“In 2004, the United States spent more than
twice as much on health care as the average OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] country, at $6,102 per person (compared with the OECD average of $2,560). Health
care spending comprised 15.3% of the U.S. GDP in 2004, compared with an average of 8.9% for the
average OECD country.”), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
83washlrev513n258.pdf.
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process mandated and developed. The universal vulnerability thesis also
provides strong arguments that some material supports, such as health
care, are issues of social welfare rather than disability law.
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